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Chapter 1
Preface
Over the past few decades, the eects of various psychological factors to decision makings
have been studied in behavioral economics. However, the eld is yet developing. The
purposes of this thesis are to contribute the development of theoretical aspect of behavioral
economics and to propose new notable phenomenon in decision makings.
The construction of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, we study the consumption-
saving decision by consumers facing to temptation that leads them to over-consumption.
Consumers can resist the temptation but it is psychologically costly. Under the assump-
tion that consumption utility is log, we propose a funded pension scheme as a commitment
device, which maximizes social welfare, which takes account of self-control cost. In chapter
3, we study a price competition between two rms, where the information about the quali-
ties are asymmetric among consumers who feels inertia to their default product. We focus
to the endogenous information acquisition of consumers and investigate some separation
equiribria. In chapter 4, we propose a formal model that can describe a phenomenon
called psychological reactance. We show that the way of the decision maker's evaluation
of reputation is important factor.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Funded Pension for
Consumers with Heterogeneous
Self-Control
2.1 Introduction
We consider a public funded pension scheme. Social security policies including a funded
pension have some objectives. One of them is income redistribution. This is common ob-
jective in almost all social security policies such as funded pensions, social aid by taxation
and pay-as-you-go pensions. Other important role of social securities is that as forced sav-
ing devices, which is specic to funded pensions. This is because funded pensions assure
subscribers that they can receive retirement incomes at least their contribution. However,
it is well known that for consumers in standard economic models, funded pensions do
not improve social welfare (e.g. Samuelson, 1975). For example, suppose that a consumer
found that his optimal amount of saving is $1000 per month. When there is no pension
policy, he privately saves $1000. When a pension is introduced and the premium that he
pays is $500 per month, he pays it and privately saves $500 because his optimal saving
is $1000. Since his total amount of saving does not change between before and after the
introducing of the pension, so does his lifetime utility. Of course, if the premium is larger
than $1000, he goes into oversaving that decreases his lifetime utility. Thus the pension
does not improve social welfare.
One of factors to justify funded pensions is temptation that leads consumers to over-
consumption (Diamond, 1977). Even if a consumer knows how much to save his income,
he often cannot help but overspending more than the amount when he has disposable in-
come. Once he faces this temptation, he feels psychological cost to self-control his wasteful
spending. So it is ideal for him not to face temptation by a valid way for commitment.
This is why we need funded pensions as a forced saving policy.
However, in the context of temptation, most of pension schemes presently used are not
suitable. It is natural that the degrees of temptation are not the same for all consumers.
While there are consumers that spend much of their income as soon as they earns them
and regret their myopic behavior, there are also consumers that can spend their income
farsightedly. Since pension schemes aect the behavior of consumers, they should be
designed with thinking of this point. However, in present pension schemes, a premium
that each consumer pays is determined mainly by his income level, not by his degree of
temptation. Our purpose is to design a pension scheme that maximizes social welfare
considering the dierence in the degree of temptation.
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In our model, the government proposes a pension schedule to consumers, where pen-
sion schedule is a list of pension plans, a pair of pension premium and its payout. Each
consumer choose a plan from the schedule and pay the premium according to the plan be-
fore his consumption, that is, before he faces to temptation. This is why the pension works
as forced saving 1. However, we allow the consumer to borrow money by collateralizing
his future payout.
Some literature studied policies as a way to resist temptation. It was shown that
funded pensions improve social welfare (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004). This is because,
as stated above, they enable consumers to avoid temptation with less self-control cost.
In addition, pay-as-you-go pension is also able to improve social welfare if temptation is
suciently large (Kumru and Thanopoulos, 2008). Other way to relieve self-control cost is
to make consumption relatively unattractive. This works because the cost arises from the
gap between the attractiveness of normatively desirable alternatives and that of tempting
alternative. Krusell et al. (2010) shows that subsidies for savings improve social welfare
for this reason. Though these studies are important, their research objects are economies
with consumers whose degrees of temptation are the same for all of them. On the other
hand, our model can analyze the situation in which the degrees are dierent for dierent
consumers.
Galperti (2015) investigated an optimal contract as a commitment device. The agent is
either consistent or inconsistent, which is randomly determined and is private information
of the agent. If he is inconsistent, he values his consumption in the second period smaller
than that in the rst period. The characteristic of the model is that it takes in the
preference for exibility. It is an important stu especially when the problem has long
period. On the other hand, it is assumed that no third party can oer the agent contracts
that might interfere with the provider's devices (Galperti, 2015:p.1431). It is the advantage
of our model that agents (consumers) are allowed to make debt after they choose their
devices.
Since we need a model that describes decisions with temptation and self-control, we
apply the model proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), henceforth GP. They consid-
ered two kinds of preferences over alternatives, normative preferences and temptation
preferences, which are represented by functions u and v, respectively. Using u and v, the
valuation of menu (a set of alternatives) M is dened by
W (M)  max
x2M
[u(x) + v(x)] max
y2M
v(y): (2.1)
GP assumes that, for a given menu M , a decision maker chooses an alternative x 2 M
that maximizes u(x) + v(x). The intuition is that he chooses a compromise between
normative desirability and temptation desirability after facing temptation. Let x 2 M
be an alternative that maximizes u(x) + v(x). Then (2.1) is rewritten as
W (M) = u(x) 

max
y2M
v(y)  v(x)

:
The term maxy2M v(y)   v(x) represents self-control cost. For instance, suppose that
a consumer faces a menu M = fs; hg, where s and h represents salad and hamburger,
respectively. And suppose that he wants to diet but he likes meat. In GP model, u
corresponds to a desirability of health and v does to a desirability of having what he likes.
Thus u(s) > u(h) and v(h) > u(s) holds. If u(s)+v(s) > u(h)+v(h), he chooses salad for
1We focus on sophisticated consumers, that is, each consumer knows that he will face to temptation at
the decision of consumption.
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his lunch. Note that salad does not maximize v, thus he gives up satisfaction of temptation
as much as v(h)  v(s). GP dened self-control cost by this dierence. Generalizing this
concept, we have the expression above.
Menus correspond to budget sets in consumption choice problems. If a pension pre-
mium can shrink the budget sets, it works as a commitment device and decreases self-
control cost. Formally, assume that a pension premium makes a menu M shrink to
M 0  M . Then we have maxy2M 0 v(y) 6 maxy2M v(y), thus maxy2M 0 v(y)   v(x) 6
maxy2M v(y)   v(x) follows. Especially, if the inequality holds strictly, the self-control
cost decreases strictly.
As an alternative approach to analyze myopic behaviors, we may use (quasi) hyperbolic
discounting model provided by Laibson (1997). Actually, some literature on economic
policies employ this approach (e.g. Roeder, 2014). The model describes the situation in
which preferences are time inconsistent. However, the model cannot describe self-control
cost explicitly. Since we want to treat eects of temptation and self-control separately, we
employ GP model that is proper for our objective.
Our main contribution is presenting a concrete way to design the optimal pension
scheme under the assumption that normative utility is log(c). This scheme has some
interesting character. First, the optimal schedule consists of plans that return just as
managed premium paid by a consumer that chose the plan. This implies that no income
redistribution is made. Second, the consumer with smaller self-control cost chooses a
smaller premium in an equilibrium. If he pays the large amount of premium, he faces
larger temptation of borrowing since the premium brings him a large borrowing facility.
So he chooses a small premium to avoid it. If consumers cannot borrow money, the optimal
schedule has unique plan whose premium is equal to the amount of saving that consumers
choose when there is no temptation and no pension scheme. Third, the optimal schedule
does not depend on the information of types such as its distribution and even what types
there are. This means that the government does not need to know these information. This
is a benecial feature from a practical viewpoint.
Section 2 introduces notations and assumptions used in the study and looks at the
consumption-saving decision of a consumer with a self-control preference. Section 3 studies
identical-type and two-type economies as benchmarks and shows the monotonicity of an
optimal pension. In section 4, we generalize the results in section 3 to nitely many types
and continuous-types model. We show that the results are robust for generalization. In
section 5, we discuss the eect of a borrowing constraint and extend the model to analyze
income diversity.
2.2 Model
The only dierence between standard models of pension and our model is that consumers
have preference with temptation and self-control. There are consumers and an government.
At rst, the government oers a set of pairs of pension payout and pension premium to each
consumer before his consumption decision in working age. Then the consumers choose one
of pairs from the set. After a payment of premium the consumer has chosen, he decides
how much to consume in working age.
2.2.1 Budget Constraint
We standardize the population of consumer to be 1. Each consumer is endowed with an
identical income of I 2 R++. Let R 2 R+ and P 2 [0; I] be a pension payout and a
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Figure 2.1: Budget constraint
pension premium, respectively. We assume the upper bound of P to be I to rule out
situations in which consumers borrow money to pay the premiums. We call a pair of R
and P pension plan. For the simplicity of notation, we dene the set of possible pension
plans as T  R+  [0; 1]. A pension schedule is a set of pension plans.
In period 0, each consumer chooses a pension plan  2 T , from a pension schedule
S  T . At the same time, he has to pay the government the pension premium he has
chosen. In period 1, he decides the amounts of consumption c1 2 R+ and saving I P  c1
in working age. We assume that consumers can also borrow money in period 1 with
putting up their pension income as collateral. Thus, if I   P   c1 is strictly greater (less)
than 0, it represents the amount of saving (borrowing). Let r,  2 R++ be the interest
rate for saving and borrowing, respectively. Thus if a consumer chose  = (R;P ), he can
borrow up to R1+ . About interest rates, we assume that  > r > 0. This assumption
is natural from a practical standpoint. In period 2, he receives a pension income R and
decides consumption in old age c2 2 R+.
The budget set for consumers having chosen  = (R;P ) is summarized as follows.
B() 
8<:(c1; c2) 2 R2+ :
c1 6 I   P + R1+ ;
I   P   c1 > 0) c2 6 (1 + r)(I   P   c1) +R;
I   P   c1 < 0) c2 6 (1 + )(I   P   c1) +R
9=; :
Denote the set of all possible B() by B. Figure shows this budget constraint. As you
see, the budget line kinks at (c1; c2) = (I   P;R).
2.2.2 Preference
Consumers have self-control preference introduced by GP. We begin with dening two
kinds of utility functions representing preference over consumption. One is normative
utility function u : R+ ! R and the other is temptation utility function v : R+ ! R. To
express the temptation, v is specialized as v(; )  u(; ), where  2   R+ denotes
the strength of the temptation. This form of temptation utility is also used in Gul and
Pesendorfer (2004). We assume the value  diers across agent and is private information.
For any  2 , let n be a proportion of consumer, that is, n satises 0 6 n 6 1
and
P
2 n = 1. In section 4.2, we consider continuous . Then the proportion is
represented by a distribution function F : ! [0; 1] with density function f : ! R+.
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We impose a few assumptions about the normative utility function.
Assumption 2.2.1. u is twice continuously dierentiable.
Assumption 2.2.2. u is strictly concave and satises u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0.
Assumption 2.2.3. limc!0 u0(c) =1.
For example, these assumption is satised if normative utility functions is u(c) = log(c)
or u(c) = c with  2 (0; 1). In the latter half of this chapter, we assume u(c)  log(c) to
derive sharper results. Applying the utility function by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), the
preference over budget sets is represented by the function W : B  R+ ! R satises that
W (B();) = max
(c1;c2)2B()

u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c1)
  max
(c1;c2)2B()
u(c1)
= max
(c1;c2)2B()

(1 + )u(c1) + u(c2)
  max
(c1;c2)2B()
u(c1);
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor.
Using assumption 2.2.2, we have the following claim.
Claim 2.2.1. max(c1;c2)2B() u(c1) = u

I   P + R1+

.
This is obvious by u0(c) > 0 (assumption 2.2.2) and the constraint for c1 is c1 6
I   P + R1+ .
2.2.3 Consumption
In this section, we consider the consumption problem contained in W (B();), that is,
max(c1;c2)2B()

(1+)u(c1)+u(c2)

. When the consumer of type  2  chooses a pension
plan  2 T , let his optimal consumption in period t be ct ().
There can be the three types of consumption: positive saving, zero saving (or balanced)
and negative saving (or borrowing). The type of optimal consumption depends on the
pension plan that a consumer has chosen. Intuitively, since a large premium brings too
little disposable income at a working age, it may be necessary for him to borrow to achieve
his desired level of consumption. Formally, we separate T as
T s  f 2 T : c1() < I   Pg
T b  f 2 T : c1() = I   Pg
T d  f 2 T : c1() > I   Pg:
s , 

b and 

d denote the typical elements of T

s , T

b and T

d , respectively.  in superscript
is omitted if there is no threat of confusion. Note that if  2 Tb, c2() = R, since u0(c) > 0
and income in period 2 is only pension income R.
We have the necessary conditions for optimality in dierent form for s and d since
the budget constraint in period 2 diers. In this consumption optimization problem, an
objective function is U(c1; c2)  (1 + )u(c1) + u(c2). So (the absolute value of) the
marginal rate of substitution of c1 for c2 is
@U(c1;c2)
@c1
@U(c1;c2)
@c2
=
(1 + )u0(c1)
u0(c2)
:
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If  2 Ts, the budget line has the slope of 1 + r. So the necessary condition for s is 2
(1 + )u0(c1(s))
u0(c2(s))
= 1 + r
,(1 + )u0(c1(s)) = (1 + r)u0(c2(s)): (2.2)
On the other hand, if  2 Td, the budget line has a slope of 1 + . So the necessary
condition for d is
(1 + )u0(c1(d))
u0(c2(d))
= 1 + 
,(1 + )u0(c1(d)) = (1 + )u0(c2(d)): (2.3)
Since a budget line kinks at the consumption vector for b, the slope of the line there is
not dened. Thus we cannot derive a condition as in other cases. However, we have at
least the following inequality:
1 + r <
(1 + )u0(c1(b))
u0(c2(b))
< 1 + 
,(1 + r)u0(c2(b)) < (1 + )u0(c1(b)) < (1 + )u0(c2(b)):
2.2.4 Government
The government oers consumers a pension schedule S  f 2 T :  2 g  T , a set of
pension plans. The objective of the government is to maximize the (expected) aggregated
welfare of consumers while controlling S to satisfy the following conditions:
W (B();) >W (B( 0);); 8 2 ; 8 0 2 S (IC)
(1 + r)
X
2
nP >
X
2
nR: (FB)
The rst condition states that the consumers of type  2  will choose a plan () at their
own initiative; in other words, this is the condition for not giving consumers any incentive
to report their types untruthfully. Note that this is not necessary when types are public
information since then government can force any plan on consumers.
The second condition states that S is feasible. We assume that pension management
interest rate r is the same as that of the private saving. This means that there is no
dierence between the government and private banks in the ability to manage assets.
We also assume that we can ignore an individual rationality condition since the pension
is managed by the government, which has the power of consumers' participation.
2.3 Benchmark
2.3.1 Identical-type consumers
In this section, we consider the simple case in which all consumers have identical type,
that is,  = fg and this is common knowledge. Then the condition (IC) can be ignored.
Moreover, since  is identical, the condition (FB) is rewritten as private condition, that
is, (1 + r)P () > R().
2 There is not any corner solution because of assumption 2.2.3.
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Consider the individual welfare functionW ( ;). Dene  : T ! R to be the marginal
rate of substitution of R for P on  2 T , that is,
() =  
@W ( ;)
@R
@W ( ;)
@P
:
Since we cannot represent the optimal consumption in a general form, we have to consider
the optimal pension plan separately. However, the following lemma makes it easy to
analyze.
Lemma 2.3.1. For any individual welfare level, an indierence curve corresponding to
the level in R-P plane satises following properties.
(i) (s) is greater than or equal to
1
1+r , where equality holds if and only if  = 0.
(ii) (d) is equal to
1
1+ <
1
1+r .
(iii) Every indierence curve is dierentiable.
Proof of property (i). Consider arbitrary  2 Ts. Then we have
W (B();) = (1 + )u(c1()) + u
 
c2()
  uI   P + R
1 + 

:
The marginal welfare of R is calculated as follows:
@W (B();)
@R
=(1 + )u0(c1())
@c1()
@R
+ u0
 
c2())
@c2()
@R
  
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

Since c2(s) = (1 + r)(I   P   c1(s)) +R, @c2(s)@R =  (1 + r)@c1(s)@R + 1. Hence we have
@W (B();)
@R
=
n
(1 + )u0(c1())  (1 + r)u0(c2())
o@c1()
@R
+ u0(c2())  
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

= u0(c2())  
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

:
The second equality follows by the rst order condition for optimal consumption, that is,
(1 + )u0(c1()) = (1 + r)u0(c2()). Moreover, the last line can be rewritten as
1 + 
1 + r
u0(c1())  
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

;
and this is strictly positive. To see this, use assumption 2.2.2. Since c1() 6 I   P + R1+
and u00(c) < 0, it holds that u0(c1()) > u0

I   P + R1+

. By  > r and  > 0, we have
@W ( ;)
@R > 0.
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Next, the marginal welfare of P is
@W (B();)
@P
= (1 + )u0(c1())
@c1()
@P
  u0(c2())(1 + r)

1 +
@c1()
@P

+ u0

I   P + R
1 + 

=
n
(1 + )u0(c1())  (1 + r)u0(c2())
o@c1()
@P
  (1 + r)u0(c2()) + u0

I   P + R
1 + 

=  (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R
1 + 

:
By the same ways as in the previous paragraph, the equalities follow and the last line
is strictly negative.
Thus, () for  2 Ts is
() =  
@W (B();)
@R
@W (B();)
@P
=
 u0(c2()) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+
 :
We show that this is greater than or equal to 11+r . Since  > r, we have
  (1 + )u0(c1()) + 1 + r
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

6  (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R
1 + 

;
where equality holds if  = 0. Furthermore, since u0

I   P + R1+

> 0 it holds only if
 = 0. Using the rst order condition,
  (1 + r)u0(c2()) + 1 + r
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

6  (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R
1 + 

:
Note that the right-hand side is strictly negative. Thus this inequality is rewritten as,
 u0(c1()) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+
 > 1
1 + r
,() > 1
1 + r
:
Proof of Property (ii). Calculating () for  2 Td, we have
() =
 u0(c2()) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+

=
 (1 + )u0(c2()) + u0

I   P + R1+

(1 + )
n
 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+
o :
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By the rst order condition for  2 Td in the consumption problem, we have
(1 + )u0(c2()) = (1 + )u0(c1()):
Therefore () =
1
1+ <
1
1+r .
Proof of Property (iii). It is enough to show that there exist  2 Ts and  2 Td such that
() is equal to that for  2 Tb, respectively. We have found that the slopes are
 u0(c2()) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+
 ; if  2 Ts (2.4)
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 ; if  2 Tb (2.5)
 u0(c2()) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(c1()) + u0

I   P + R1+
 ; if  2 Td: (2.6)
Fix arbitrary P^ 2 [0; I] and choose any pair (R; P^ ) such that (R; P^ ) 2 Ts. Similarly,
choose any pair (R0; P^ ) such that (R0; P^ ) 2 Tb. Denote sup(R;P^ )2Ts R by R(P^ ). Note that
consumption function is continuous. According to the denitions of Ts and Tb, it follows
that
c1(R; P^ )! I   P^ ; c2(R; P^ )! R(P^ )
c1(R
0P^ )! I   P^ ; c2(R0; P^ )! R(P^ )
as R! R(P^ ) and R0 ! R(P^ ):
Then we have
lim
R!R(P^ )
(R; P^ ) =
 u0(R(P^ )) + 1+u0

I   P^ + R(P^ )1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P^ ) + u0

I   P^ + R(P^ )1+

lim
R0!R(P^ )
(R
0; P^ ) =
 u0(R(P^ )) + 1+u0

I   P^ + R(P^ )1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P^ ) + u0

I   P^ + R(P^ )1+
 ;
that is, limR!R(P^ ) (R; P^ ) = limR0!R(P^ ) (R
0; P^ ). Therefore the indierence curve is
smoothly continuous at (R(P^ ); P^ ). Similarly we can prove the latter half of property
(iii).
Even though the consumption patterns are dierent for  , this lemma states that
indierence curves for xed welfare are smooth. Thus we can use the standard method of
welfare maximization. The indierence curve is shown in Figure 2.2. Here, the pension
plan that satises feasibility is in the upper-left area of the line P = R1+r . Hence we nd
that optimal plans are determined at the tangent point of the indierence curve and the
line of P = R1+r . According to the lemma 2.3.1, the indierence curve does not have any
tangent to the line P = R1+r at  2 Ts and  2 Td if  > 0. Thus, if  is optimal, it is
included in Tb except the case of  = 0. If  = 0, since (s) =
1
1+r , all s 2 Ts are
optimal.
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P=
R
1+ r
Λ>0
Λ=0
1
1+ r
1
1+ Ρ
R
P
Figure 2.2: Indierence curves
Let us consider optimal  . First, we assume that  > 0. As we discussed, it is enough
to obtain optimal plans to consider  2 Tb. The optimal plan is determined at the tangent
point of the indierence curve and P = R1+r . Here, we have
(b) =
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 :
Thus the necessary condition is
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 = 1
1 + r
:
This can be rearranged as
 =
(1 + r)u0(R)  u0(I   P )
u0(I   P )   r1+u0

I   P + R1+
 :
The denominator on the right-hand side is obviously positive since I   P 6 I    r1+P
and r1+ < 1. However, we cannot state whether the numerator is positive or negative.
Indeed, R = (1+r)P in the solution then the numerator is (1+r)u0((1+r)P ) u0(I P ).
This is positive for a suciently small P but negative for a suciently large P . Since 
is greater than 0, in order to characterize the optimal plan, we consider only P such that
(1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P ) > 0. Dene Q : P !  as
Q(P )  (1 + r)u
0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P )
u0(I   P )   r1+u0

I    r1+P
 ; (2.7)
where P  fP 2 [0; I] : (1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P ) > 0g.
Let us see what properties Q has. Importantly, the following lemma says that the
optimal  is unique for each  > 0, that is, there exists an inverse function for Q.
Lemma 2.3.2. Q satises the following properties.
(i) Q is strictly decreasing.
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(ii) Q(P )!1 as P ! 0.
(iii) Q(P ) = 0 if P satises (1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P ) = 0.
Proof of property (i). Let P and P 0 be arbitrary premiums such that P 0 > P . By the
assumptions of u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0, we have
u0(I   P 0)    r
1 + 
u0

I     r
1 + 
P 0

> u0(I   P )    r
1 + 
u0

I     r
1 + 
P

and
(1 + r)u0((1 + r)P 0)  u0(I   P 0) < (1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P ):
So it follows that
Q(P ) =
(1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P )
u0(I   P )   r1+u0

I    r1+P
 > (1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P )
u0(I   P 0)   r1+u0

I    r1+P 0

>
(1 + r)u0((1 + r)P 0)  u0(I   P 0)
u0(I   P 0)   r1+u0

I    r1+P 0
 = Q(P 0):
Therefore, Q is strictly decreasing.
Proof of property (ii). By assumption 2.2.3, we have
lim
P!0
Q(P ) = lim
P!0
24(1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )  u0(I   P )
u0(I   P )   r1+u0

I    r1+P

35 =1:
Proof of property (iii). Since u0(I P )   r1+u0

I    r1+P

is positive for any P 6 I <1,
the property is obvious.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal pension plan.
Theorem 2.3.1. The optimal pension plan is determined by the inverse function of Q.
Proof. Q corresponds to an arbitrary pension premium P 2 P to type  2  whose
optimal pension premium is P . By the lemma 2.3.2, Q is one to one function. In addition,
properties (i) and (ii) say that Q is onto function. Therefore, for Q, there exists an inverse
function that determines the optimal pension premium for any  2 .
Theorem 2.3.1 together with property (i) in the lemma 2.3.2 says that it is optimal
to set a lower premium for consumers that feel greater temptation. This result can be
understood by the following discussion. Consider the situation when a consumer does not
save and not borrow at all. His welfare function is rewritten as
W (B();) = (1 + )u(I   P ) + u((1 + r)P )  u

I     r
1 + 
P

= u(I   P ) + u((1 + r)P )  

u

I     r
1 + 
P

  u(I   P )

:
12
ΛL
ΛM
ΛH
ΤL
ΤM
ΤH
P=
R
1 + r
R
P
Figure 2.3: Optimal plans
The summation of the rst and second terms represents the utility of consumption and
the third term represents the cost of self-control. Dierentiate both sides with P and we
have the marginal utility minus the marginal cost of P ,
@W (B();)
@P
=  u0(I   P ) + (1 + r)u0((1 + r)P )
  

 u0

I     r
1 + 
P

  r
1 + 

+ u0(I   P )

:
The rst-order condition says that the marginal utility equals the marginal cost at optimal
P . Dierentiate this again with P and we have
@2W (B();)
@P 2
=u00(I   P ) + (1 + r)2u00((1 + r)P )
  
"
u00

I     r
1 + 
P

  r
1 + 
2
  u00(I   P )
#
:
By assumption 2.2.2, the marginal utility decreases as P increases. And in the proof of
the lemma 2.3.2, we have seen that the marginal cost increases as P does. Note that
the increase in  raises the marginal cost and we can see that P , at the point where
marginal utility equals marginal cost, moves lower. Therefore, higher  implies lower P ().
Intuitively, the increase in P has two eects. One eect reduces the amount of money the
consumer can use when she is young. For the optimal plan, it holds that R = (1 + r)P .
Hence the increase of P means the increase of R. Thus another eect enlarges the amount
of money that the consumer can borrow when she is young and it increases the temptation
of borrowing. For consumers with larger , the latter eect is stronger. Therefore to avoid
a high self-control cost, it is not proper to apply a large pension premium to a consumer
with large . This result can be understood also by a picture. In Figure 2.3, each of three
indierence curves for L; M ; H , where ,L < M < H , is a tangent to line P =
R
1+r .
The tangent points are the optimal plans. Obviously, as  increases, the optimal plan is
determined in the lower-left area of the plane.
At the end of this subsection, we consider the value of (1+ r)u0((1+ r)P ) u0(I  P )
in property (iii). It is equivalent to the amount of saving when  = 0 and there is no
pension policy. We have already shown that any  2 T 0s is optimal for a consumer with
 = 0. That is, when a consumer does not feel any temptation, it is optimal to impose
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an arbitrary premium between 0 and the optimal amount of saving. This is a well-known
result: if the pension earns the same interest rate as private savings, these two ways
of saving are indierent and so the pension does not improve welfare (For example, see
Samuelson, 1975). Interestingly, however, when a consumer has  > 0, this result does
not hold. Even if the interest rates are equal to each other, the private saving and the
pension are not equivalent.
2.3.2 Two types of consumers
In this section, we consider two types of heterogeneous consumers. The assumption of
complete information is a useful benchmark. So we begin with the situation where the
government knows what type each consumer has. Denote the types as L and H , where
0 < L < H . And the population of L and H are nL and nH , respectively, where we
assume that nL > 0, nH > 0 and nL + nH = 1. Note that, unlike in the identical-type
case, we cannot state that R = (1+r)P is always satised at optimal schedules since there
may be transfer between the types.
Remember that the marginal welfare of P for each agent is negative. Hence the pension
schedule S  fL; Hg such that PL > RL1+r and PH > RH1+r is not optimal since the schedule
satises the feasibility constraint slackly, so that a suciently small decrease in P is feasible
and improves social welfare. It is also clear that the pension schedule such that PL <
RL
1+r
and PH <
RH
1+r is not feasible.
In addition, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.3.3. If a pension schedule f^L; ^Hg is feasible, then the schedules fL; Hg such
that "
PL >
RL   R^L
1 + r
+ P^L; H = ^H
#
(2.8)
or "
PH >
RH   R^H
1 + r
+ P^H ; L = ^L
#
(2.9)
are also feasible.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we show that the schedule that satises (2.8) is feasible.
Suppose that f^L; ^Hg is feasible; that is,
(1 + r)(nLP^L + nH P^H) > nLR^L + nHR^H
,(1 + r)nLP^L >  (1 + r)nH P^H + nLR^L + nHR^H : (2.10)
Choose a schedule such that PL > RL R^L1+r + P^L; H = ^H arbitrarily. Then it follows that
PL >
RL   R^L
1 + r
+ P^L
,(1 + r)nLPL   nL(RL   R^L) > (1 + r)nLP^L:
Together with (2.10), we have
(1 + r)nLPL   nL(RL   R^L) + (1 + r)nH P^H > nLR^L + nHR^H
,(1 + r)(nLPL + nH P^H) > nLRL + nHR^H :
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Figure 2.4: Individually feasible schedules for (R^; P^ )
τ
P= R
1 + r
1
1 + r
R
P
Figure 2.5:  is not optimal plan
By H = ^H , it follows that
(1 + r)(nLPL + nHPH) > nLRL + nHRH :
Thus, the schedule fL; Hg is feasible. We can show the feasibility of the schedule that
satises (2.9).
For a given plan (^), we call the plans  that satisfy P > R R^1+r + P^ individually
feasible. Figure 2.4 depicts the set of schedules that is individually feasible for (R^; P^ ).
The lemma 2.3.3 is useful for searching for solutions. For example, in Figure 2.5, ()
is lower than 11+r . Note that with complete information, we can ignore the incentive
compatibility conditions. Hence a pension plan for another type can be xed arbitrarily.
Then there is room for the improvement. Indeed, obviously  is not optimal since we
can nd individually feasible and more preferable plans in the hatched area in the Figure.
The point is that if this improvement is available, it works individually; that is, it does
not need transfer between types. Thus this is a Pareto improvement.
The next lemma is important for proving the lemma 2.3.5.
Lemma 2.3.4. For any  2   R+,  such that () = 11+r satises R > 0.
Proof. Fix arbitrary  2   R+ and choose  such that () = 11+r . Note that
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() =
1
1+r implies  2 Tb. () is equal to
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 :
Then, by assumption 2.2.3,
lim
R!0
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

 (1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+

=
  limR!0 u0(R) + 1+u0(I   P )
 u0(I   P )
=
 1
 u0(I   P ) =1:
Since () is decreasing in R,  such that () =
1
1+r satises R > 0.
The following lemma, derived from the previous lemma gives the condition for opti-
mality.
Lemma 2.3.5. In the optimal schedule with complete information fL; Hg, both L(L)
and H(H) are equal to
1
1+r .
Proof. Suppose that either L(L) or H(H) is not equal to
1
1+r . Without loss of gener-
ality, suppose that L(L) 6= 11+r .
(i) L(L) >
1
1+r
Consider "1, "2 > 0 such that "2 =
"1
1+r . For such "1 and "2, let R
0  RL + "1 and
P 0  PL + "2. Then it follows that
"2 =
"1
1 + r
,PL + "2 = RL + "1  RL
1 + r
+ PL
,P 0 = R
0  RL
1 + r
+ PL;
that is,  0 = (R0; P 0) is individually feasible by lemma 2.3.3. The line represented by this
equation has the slope of 11+r on R-P plane and passes through (RL; PL). Furthermore,
the marginal rate of substitution at L is L(L) >
1
1+r . Thus for suciently small "1
and "2, 
0 brings more individual welfare. Since there exists an another schedule that is
feasible and preferable to fL; Hg, fL; Hg is not optimal.
(ii) L(L) <
1
1+r
Consider "1, "2 > 0, which satises that "2 =
"1
1+r . For such "1 and "2, let R
0  RL "1
and P 0  PL   "2. Here, for L such that L(L) < 11+r , it is satised that R > 0 by the
lemma 2.3.4. Then, similar to the previous case, it is satised that
"2 =
"1
1 + r
,PL   "2 = RL   "1  RL
1 + r
+ PL
,P 0 = R
0  RL
1 + r
+ PL;
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that is,  0 = (R0; P 0) is individually feasible by the lemma 2.3.3. This line has the slope
of 11+r and passes through (RL; PL). Furthermore, the marginal rate of substitution at L
is L(L) <
1
1+r . Thus, for suciently small "1 and "2, 
0 brings more individual welfare.
Since there exists another schedule that is feasible and preferable to fL; Hg, fL; Hg is
not optimal.
By the lemma 2.3.5, if a pension schedule is optimal, it holds that () =
1
1+r for all
 2 . Together with the lemma 2.3.4, if a pension schedule is optimal, we have R > 0
for all  2 . That is, if a consumer feels temptation, the funded pension improves social
welfare.
Here, we have the following result.
Theorem 2.3.2. If  6= 0, it is not optimal that  = 0.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary , 0. By the lemma 2.3.5, if the singleton schedule of fg
is optimal, it is satised that
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

(1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 = 1
1 + r
and
 u0(R) + 01+u0

I   P + R1+

(1 + 0)u0(I   P ) + 0u0

I   P + R1+
 = 1
1 + r
;
then it must be follow that
 u0(R) + 1+u0

I   P + R1+

(1 + )u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
 =  u0(R) + 01+u0

I   P + R1+

(1 + 0)u0(I   P ) + 0u0

I   P + R1+
 : (2.11)
This is a necessary condition for  is optimal. For simplicity, we abbreviate some parts
of (2.11) as follows:
A   u0(R)
B  1
1 + 
u0

I   P + R
1 + 

C  u0(I   P )
D  u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R
1 + 

:
Then (2.11) is rewritten to,
A+ B
C + D
=
A+ 0B
C + 0D
,(A+ B)(C + 0D) = (A+ 0B)(C + D)
,(  0)(AD  BC) = 0:
By assumption 2.2.2, AD =  u0(R)
h
u0(I   P ) + u0

I   P + R1+
i
is strictly negative
and BC = 11+u
0

I   P + R1+

u0(I   P ) is strictly positive, it must be that  = 0.
This implies (2.11), necessary condition for singleton schedule to be optimal, is satised
only if  = 0.
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That is, if consumers have dierent strength of temptation, applying a common pension
plan is not optimal. This is consistent with our rst intuition.
Next we construct the optimal schedule in this situation. To obtain a precise result,
henceforth we specialize in the normative utility function as u(c) = log c for all c 2 R+.
log c satises assumptions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. For this specialized utility function, we have
the following consumptions:
c1() =
8>>><>>>:
(1+)
 
(1+r)(I P )+R

(1+r)(1++) if 0 6 P < I   (1+)R(1+r)
I   P if I   (1+)R(1+r) 6 P 6 I   (1+)R(1+)
(1+)
 
(1+)(I P )+R

(1+)(1++) otherwise;
c2() =
8>>><>>>:

 
(1+r)(I P )+R

1++ if 0 6 P < I   (1+)R(1+r)
R if I   (1+)R(1+r) 6 P 6 I   (1+)R(1+)

 
(1+)(I P )+R

1++ otherwise:
Next we consider the locus of points at which () equals
1
1+r . According to the lemma
2.3.1, it is enough to obtain the locus to consider  such that I  (1+)R(1+r) 6 P 6 I  (1+)R(1+) .
Consider an arbitrary  2 . Then the individual welfare for such  is
W (B();) = (1 + ) log(I   P ) +  log(R)   log

I   P + R
1 + 

:
We have
() =
  R + (1+)(I P )+R
  1+I P + (1+)(1+)(I P )+R
:
The relation between P and R such that () =
1
1+r is as follows:
P = I  KR;
K 1 + + (1 + r)(  ) +
p
(1 + r)22 + (1 + + (1 + r))2 + 2(1 + r)(1 + (1  r)+ (1 + 2))
2(1 + r)(1 + )
:
Proposition 2.3.1. For any  > 0 and 0 > 0 such that  6= 0, if () = 0( 0) = 11+r ,
then  6=  0.
Proof. Fix arbitrarily  > 0 and 0 > 0 such that  6= 0. Suppose that for  and  0,
() = 0(
0) = 11+r . Then it holds that P = I   KR and P 0 = I   K0R0. Note
that the relation between P and R and that between P 0 and R0 are linear with the slopes
of  K and  K0 , respectively. We show that if  > 0, then K > K0 . Calculating
K  K0 , we have
K  K0
=
1 + + (1 + r)(  ) +p(1 + r)22 + (1 + + (1 + r))2 + 2(1 + r)(1 + (1  r)+ (1 + 2))
2(1 + r)(1 + )
  1 + + (1 + r)(
0   ) +p(1 + r)22 + (1 + + (1 + r)0)2 + 2(1 + r)(1 + (1  r)0 + (1 + 20))
2(1 + r)(1 + )
=
(1 + r)+
p
(1 + r)22 + (1 + + (1 + r))2 + 2(1 + r)(1 + (1  r)+ (1 + 2))
2(1 + r)(1 + )
  (1 + r)
0 +
p
(1 + r)22 + (1 + + (1 + r)0)2 + 2(1 + r)(1 + (1  r)0 + (1 + 20))
2(1 + r)(1 + )
:
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Comparing inside the square roots, the former is larger than the latter. Thus we have
K > K0 . Though  = 
0 holds only if R = R0 = 0, R > 0 and R0 > 0 by the lemma
2.3.4. Therefore  6=  0.
This proposition states that the point at which the indierence curve of each consumer
is tangential to the feasibility frontier diers according to the type.
By the lemma 2.3.5, the optimal schedule satises that L(L) = H(H) =
1
1+r so we
have
PL = I  KLRL
PH = I  KHRH :
As we have mentioned, the feasibility condition is satised with equality for the optimal
schedule. Hence, according to the feasibility condition, we have
(1 + r)[nLPL + nHPH ] = nLRL + nHRH
,(1 + r)[nL(I  KLRL) + nH(I  KHRH)] = nLRL + nHRH
,(1 + r)[I   nLKLRL   nHKKRH ] = nLRL + nHRH
,(1 + (1 + r)KH)nHRH = (1 + r)I   (1 + (1 + r)KL)nLRL
,RH = (1 + r)I
(1 + (1 + r)KH)nH
  (1 + (1 + r)KL)nL
(1 + (1 + r)KH)nH
RL:
Thus the summarized problem is that
max
fg=L;H
nL

(1 + L) log(I   PL) +  logRL   L log

I   PL + RL
1 + r

+ nH

(1 + H) log(I   PH) +  logRH   H log

I   PH + RH
1 + r

s.t. PL = I  KLRL; PH = I  KHRH
RH =
(1 + r)I
(1 + (1 + r)KH)nH
  (1 + (1 + r)KL)nL
(1 + (1 + r)KH)nH
RL:
Substituting PL, PH , and RH , this problem can be seen as simply one variable problem.
The rst-order condition is
@W
@RL
=
nL[(nH + nL)(1 + (1 + r)KL)RL   (1 + r)I](1 + )
RL(nL(1 + (1 + r)KL)RL   (1 + r)I) = 0
,RL = (1 + r)I
1 + (1 + r)KL
:
Then we have
PL = I   KL(1 + r)I
1 + (1 + r)KL
=
I
1 + (1 + r)KL
RH =
(1 + r)I   (1 + (1 + r)KL)nL (1+r)I(1+(1+r)KL)
(1 + (1 + r)KH)nH
=
(1 + r)I
1 + (1 + r)KH
:
PH = I  KH (1 + r)I
1 + (1 + r)KH
=
I
1 + (1 + r)KH
:
Seeing this result, we nd that the optimal schedule satises R = (1 + r)P for  2 .
In this situation, the incentive compatibility condition is strictly satised. Therefore, we
have the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.3.3. Assume u(c) = log c and jj = 2. The optimal pension schedule has the
following form: for any  2 ,
P =
I
1 + (1 + r)K
;
R = (1 + r)P:
We can see some things from the result. First, there is no monetary transfer among
types since the optimal plans are balanced for each type. Second, similar to the identical-
type case, there are no private saving and borrowing at the optimal schedule. This implies
that the monetary market is balanced. Third, and importantly, the optimal schedule
does not depend on the distribution of types.Indeed, it does not contain nL and nH .
Furthermore, consider the following mechanism. The government shows a pension schedule
such that 
(R;P ) 2 T : P = R
1 + r

and let each consumer announce the maximal amount of pension she foresees wanting
in old age. Then the consumer is enrolled in the pension plan that is in accord with
her decision. Though formal proof is omitted, this mechanism implements the optimal
schedule with a weakly dominant strategy. This follows by the convexity of individual
welfare and not by the existing externality between types. Note that this mechanism does
not need any information about types, such as the distribution and even what types there
are.
2.4 Generalization
In this section, we generalize our model. One generalization is about the number of
types. First, we consider the case of many nite types. Then we consider the case of
continuous types. As in the previous section, we specialize the normative utility function
as a logarithm function.
2.4.1 Finite types
Consider the set of types  = f1; 2; : : : ; mg, where m < 1. Denote the population
of type i by ni, where it is assumed that
Pm
i=1 ni = 1 and ni > 0 for all i 2 . The
problem is that
max
S
mX
i=1
ni

(1 + i) log(I   Pi) +  logRi   i log

I   Pi + Ri
1 + 

s.t. (1 + r)
mX
i=1
niPi >
mX
i=1
niRi:
We can apply the lemma 2.3.5 also in this model. Thus, by substituting Pi = I  KiRi in
the problem, we have
max
S
mX
i=1
ni

(1 + i) logKiRi +  logRi   i log

Ki +
1
1 + 

Ri

s.t. (1 + r)
mX
i=1
ni(I  KiRi) >
mX
i=1
niRi:
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The associated Lagrangian is
L 0
"
mX
i=1
ni

(1 + i) logKiRi +  logRi   i log

Ki +
1
1 + 

Ri
#
+ 1
"
(1 + r)
mX
i=1
ni(I  KiRi) 
mX
i=1
niRi
#
:
The necessary condition is
@L
@Rj
= 0

nj

1 + i
Rj
+

Rj
  j
Rj

+ 1[ (1 + r)njKj   nj ] = 0; 8 2 
(0; 1) > 0
(0; 1) 6= 0
1
"
(1 + r)
mX
i=1
ni(I  KiRi) 
mX
i=1
niRi
#
= 0:
Note that [ (1+r)njKj nj ] < 0. Then if 0 = 0, the rst order condition is satised only
if 1 = 0. This contradicts the non-zero condition of Lagrange multipliers. Thus 0 > 1
and we can standardize this as 0 = 1. Then the rst-order conditions are rearranged as
nj
1 + 
Rj
  1[(1 + r)njKj   nj ] = 0; 8 2 : (2.12)
1 is not zero since the rst term is strictly positive. So the feasibility condition is satised
with equality. By (2.12), we have
1 =
1
(1 + r)Kj + 1

1 + 
Rj

:
Thus for any j 2  and k 2 , it follows that
1
(1 + r)Kj + 1

1 + 
Rj

=
1
(1 + r)Kk + 1

1 + 
Rk

,[(1 + r)Kj + 1]Rj = [(1 + r)Kk + 1]Rk: (2.13)
By the feasibility condition with equality, we have
(1 + r)
mX
i=1
ni(I  KiRi) 
mX
i=1
niRi = 0
,
mX
i=1
ni((1 + r)Ki + 1)Ri = (1 + r)I
mX
i=1
ni = (1 + r)I:
Fixing arbitrarily j 2  and using (2.13), it follows that
(1 + r)I =
mX
i=1
ni((1 + r)Ki + 1)Ri = ((1 + r)Kj + 1)Rj
mX
i=1
ni
= ((1 + r)Kj + 1)Rj
, Rj = (1 + r)I
(1 + r)Kj + 1
:
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Substituting this to Pj = I  KjRj , we have
Pj = I  Kj (1 + r)I
(1 + r)Kj + 1
=
((1 + r)Kj + 1)I   (1 + r)KjI
(1 + r)Kj + 1
=
I
(1 + r)Kj + 1
:
Thus in the solution Rj = (1 + r)Pj is satised for any type j 2 . This is the same
result as in the two types case.
2.4.2 Continuous types
Let  = [; ], where  > 0.  2  are distributed according to the distribution function
F . (R(); P ()) denotes the pension plan for the consumer whose type is  2 . We
assume that R() and P () are continuous and dierentiable.
Similarly, considering the problem with complete information, it follows that P () =
I  K()R(), c1 = I   P () and c2 = R() for each , where K() is the constant that
has the same form as K in the previous section. The problem is that
max
S
Z 


(1 + ) log(I   P ()) +  log(R())   log

I   P () + R()
1 + 

dF ()
s.t.
Z 

[(1 + r)P () R()] dF () = 0
P () = I  K()R();
where we can assume that the solution satises the feasibility condition with equality
for the same reason as in the previous section. Since the feasibility constraint includes a
integration, we rewrite it. We dene a new state variable h as
h() 
Z 

[(1 + r)P (x) R(x)] dF (x):
Then, h satises the following conditions, conversely implying the feasibility condition.
h0() = (1 + r)P () R();
h() = 0 and h() = 0:
Thus, we have the rewritten problem:
max
S
Z 


(1 + ) log(I   P ()) +  log(R())   log

I   P () + R()
1 + 

dF ()
s.t. h0() = (1 + r)P () R();
h() = 0 and h() = 0
P () = I  K()R():
The associated Hamiltonian is,
H (1 + ) log(I   P ()) +  log(R())   log

I   P () + R()
1 + 

+ ()h0()
= (1 + ) log(I   P ()) +  log(R())   log

I   P () + R()
1 + 

+ () [(1 + r)P () R()] ;
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where  is the co-state variable. Substituting P () = I  K()R(), we have,
H = (1 + ) log(K()R()) +  log(R())   log

K() +
1
1 + 

R()

+ () [(1 + r)I   ((1 + r)K() + 1)R()] :
By Pontryagin's principle,
@H
@R()
=
1 + 
R()
+

R()
  
R()
  ()((1 + r)K() + 1)R()
=
1 + 
R()
  ()((1 + r)K() + 1 = 0 (2.14)
0() =   @H
@h()
:
Note that  @H =@h() = 0, so u0() = 0. This implies that u() does not depend on .
Hence we can simply wreeite () = . (2.14) can be rearranged as,
R() =
1 + 
((1 + r)K() + 1)
:
By the feasibility condition,Z 

(1 + r)(I  K()R()) R()dF ()
=
Z 

(1 + r)I   ((1 + r)K() + 1)R()dF ()
=
Z 

(1 + r)I   ((1 + r)K() + 1) 1 + 
((1 + r)K() + 1)
dF ()
=

(1 + r)I   1 + 

Z 

dF () = (1 + r)I   1 + 

= 0
,  = 1 + 
(1 + r)I
Therefore we have,
R() =
1 + 
((1 + r)K() + 1)
=
1 + 
((1 + r)K() + 1) 1+(1+r)I
=
(1 + r)I
(1 + r)K() + 1
;
P () = I  K()R() = I   (1 + r)K()I
(1 + r)K() + 1
=
I
(1 + r)K() + 1
:
Again we obtained the relation R() = (1 + r)P (). For the same reason as in the
previous section, if we construct the pension schedule of such plans, the IC condition is
strictly satised. The following theorem summarizes this section.
Theorem 2.4.1. Assume u(c) = log c and  = [; ]. The optimal pension schedule has
the following form: for any  2 ,
P () =
I
(1 + r)K() + 1
R() = (1 + r)P ():
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2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 The eect of a borrowing constraint
So far, we have assumed that consumers are allowed to borrow money in the rst period.
In this section, we consider the special case in which consumers can borrow no money;
that is, we restrict s > 03. In the context of self-control preference, this assumption has an
important meaning. The impossibility of borrowing after paying a premium strengthens
the funded pension scheme as a commitment device.
With the borrowing constraint in place, the budget constraint is simply
B() = f(c1; c2) 2 R2+ : c1 + s 6 I   P; c2 6 (1 + r)(I   c1) +Rg:
For simplicity, we specialize a normative utility function as u(c) = log(c). Then the
consumption in period 1 is
c1() =
(
(1+)[(1+r)(I P )+R]
(1+r)(1++) if 0 6 P < I   (1+)R(1+r)
I   P if I   (1+)R(1+r) 6 P 6 I:
Similar to the case in section 3.1, we assume the identical type. Then R = (1+r)P follows.
Calculating an optimal pension plan, we have
P =
(
any number P 2 [0; I1+ ] if  = 0
I
1+ if  > 0
R = (1 + r)P; 8 > 0:
Note that P does not depend on the type if  > 0. This optimal P is equal to optimal
saving when there is no temptation and no pension policy. Intuitively, by the consumption
decision above, a consumer who paid I1+ consumes all of remaining money in period 1.
Since I1+ is the optimal saving, the optimal consumption includes all of the remaining
money. Thus, naturally, welfare is maximized without the harm of temptation. The
interest rate for the pension is the same as that for private saving, so there is no dierence
in the amount of payout between the pension and saving. However, the pension, which
make her pay a premium in advance has a role as a commitment device. Saving does not
have the role since a consumer decide how much to save after she faces the temptation.
Furthermore, importantly, now the consumer is not allowed to borrow, so the eect of
an increase in the premium further strengthens the budget set: there is no temptation to
borrow. This result is very dierent from that in sections 3 and 4.
2.5.2 Income diversity
In this section, we study the case when the income can be dier for each consumer. The
income is one of the elements in I = fI1; I2; : : : ; Img and the degree of temptation is drawn
from  = f1; 2; : : : ; kg, where 0 < I1 < I2 <    < Im < 1 and 0 < 1 < 2 <    <
k < 1. Consumers are characterized by the pair (Is; t) 2   I  . nst denotes
the proportion of the consumers having (Is; t) 2 . A pension plan for consumer with
(Is; t) is the pair (Rst; Pst). We assume that Rst and Pst are weakly positive and that
consumers have to be able to make their payment for the pension, that is, Pst 6 Is.
3There may be various strengths of the constraint, but here we consider only the strongest borrowing
constraint.
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Dierently from the degree of temptation, it is natural that the government can observe
the income of consumers. In fact, the government uses the information for an income tax
imposition. Thus we assume that the government can observe the income of consumers
but does not know the degree of temptation. However, as in the previous section, we
consider the problem with complete information at rst. Then we can use lemma 2.3.5
again because the result does not depend on income, so we can focus on the pension plans
which satises Pst = Is  KtRst. Using this, the constraint that 0 6 Pst 6 Is is rewritten
as 0 6 Rst 6 Is=Kt. The feasibility condition can also be rearranged as
(1 + r)
X
(s;t)2
nstPst >
X
(s;t)2
nstRst () (1 + r)
X
(s;t)2
nst(Is  KtRst) >
X
(s;t)2
nstRst
()
X
(s;t)2
nst f(1 + r)Is   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rstg > 0:
The solution satises the following property.
Lemma 2.5.1. If a pension schedule is optimal, it holds that Rst > 0 for all s and t.
Proof. At rst, we show that there is at least one type whose pension return is strictly
positive. Suppose that there exists consumer with (Is; t) whose pension plan is Rst = 0.
Then private welfare of the consumer is
(1 + t) log(Is   Pst) +  logRst   t log

Is   Pst + Rst
1 + 

= (1 + t) log(Is   Pst) +  log 0  t log(Is   Pst) = log(Is   Pst) +  log 0 =  1:
Note that private welfare is bounded above by the constraints. Then the social welfare
in this case is  1. On the other hand, let (R0st; P 0st) = ("; "=(1 + r)) for all s and t with
" > 0 that satises "=(1 + r) < I1. A pension schedule composed of this plan is feasible.
In fact, it holds thatX
(s;t)2
nst

(1 + r)P 0st  Rst
	
=
X
(s;t)2
nst f"  "g = 0:
The social welfare of this schedule isX
(s;t)2
nst

(1 + t) log

Is   "
1 + r

+  log "  t log

Is   "
1 + r
+
"
1 + 

This is strictly larger than  1 since the antilogarithm of the rst and the second term is
greater than 0 and the third term is bounded above by "=(1 + r) < I1 <1 and k <1.
Therefore, the schedule that assign Rst = 0 for all consumers is not a solution.
Next suppose that Rst = 0 for some s, t in the optimal shcedule. Z denote the set of
these (s; t). By the discussion above, there is at least one ~s, ~t whose plan satises R~s~t > 0.
As we saw, social welfare when there exist some consumers whose pension return is 0 is
 1. Let R0
~s~t
be " 2 (0; Rst) and the return for consumers whose initial return is 0 be R0~s~t
that satises X
(s;t)2Z
nstR
0
st = n~s~t(R~s~t   "):
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For other consumers that does not included in Z [ f~s; ~tg, their plans are not be changed
from initial plans. This assures that the feasibility condition holds. Actually,X
(s;t)2
nstf(1 + r)P 0st  R0stg
=
X
(s;t)2Z
nstf(1 + r)Pst  R0stg+
X
(s;t)62Z[f(~s;~t)g
nstf(1 + r)Pst  Rstg+ n~s~tf(1 + r)P~s~t   "g
=
X
(s;t)2Z
nst(1 + r)Pst +
X
(s;t)62Z[f(~s;~t)g
nstf(1 + r)Pst  Rstg+ n~s~tf(1 + r)P~s~t  R~s~tg
=
X
(s;t)2
f(1 + r)Pst  Rstg > 0
since the last line is feasibility condition for initial schedule. By the same reason as
the discussion above, the social welfare of the revised schedule is strictly larger than
 1. Therefore, the schedule that assign zero return to more than one consumer is not
optimal.
We use this result in the analysis below. The government's problem is as follows:
max
S
X
(s;t)2
nst

(1 + t) logKtRst +  logRst   t log

Kt +
1
1 + 

Rst

s.t
X
(s;t)2
nst f(1 + r)Is   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rstg > 0
0 6 Rst 6 Is=Kt; 8(s; t) 2 :
The associated Lagrangian is
L = 0
X
(s;t)2
nst

(1 + t) logKtRst +  logRst   t log

Kt +
1
1 + 

Rst

+ 1
X
(s;t)2
nst [(1 + r)Is   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rst] +
X
(s;t)2
2stRst +
X
(s;t)2
3st

Is
Kt
 Rst

;
where 0, 1, 2st and 3st are Lagrange multipliers. Note that 2st = 0 for all (s; t) in
the solution because of the complementary slackness conditions for the constraint Rst > 0
and lemma 2.5.1. Then the rst order conditions for Rst are
@L
@Rst
= 0nst
1 + 
Rst
  1nst(1 + (1 + r)Kt)  3st = 0: (2.15)
We can see that 0 is strictly positive in the solution. Suppose that 0 = 0. Then 1 = 0
and 3st = 0 must hold for all (s; t) by (2.15). However, this contradicts non-zero condition
of Lagrange multipliers. Hence we can standardize 0 as 1. Then (2.15) is rewritten as
1 =

1 + 
Rst
  3st
nst

1
1 + (1 + r)Kt
: (2.16)
The left hand side is independent of (s; t), the right hand side is equivalent for all (s; t).
We can exclude a schedule with Rst = Is=Kt for all (s; t) from a candidate of solution
since this schedule is infeasible. In addition, here we show the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.5.2. For all (s; t) 2 , Rst < Is=Kt.
Proof. To show this, we assume that Rst = Is=Kt for some (s; t) 2  and derive optimal
plans for other (~s; ~t) 6= (s; t). We propose a contradiction between a condition that R~s~t > 0
and a condition that 3st > 0. Dene C to be C  f(s; t) 2 : Rst = Is=Ktg. By the
denition and the complementary slackness, 3s0t0 = 0 for (s
0; t0) 62 C, which implies two
things. First, 1 > 0 by (2.16), that is, the feasibility condition is satised with equality.
Second, by (2.16) again, it holds that
1 + 
Rst
1
1 + (1 + r)Kt
=
1 + 
Rs0t0
1
1 + (1 + r)Kt0
() (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rst = (1 + (1 + r)Kt0)Rs0t0 (2.17)
for any (s; t), (s0; t0) 62 C. Using this relation, we haveX
(s;t)2
nst [(1 + r)Is   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rst]
=
X
(s;t)62C
nst [(1 + r)Is   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Rst]
+
X
(s;t)2C
nst

(1 + r)KtIs   (1 + (1 + r)Kt)Is
Kt

= 0
() (1 + (1 + r)K~t)R~s~t
X
(x;t) 62C
nst = (1 + r)
X
(s;t)62C
nstIs  
X
(s;t)2C
nstIs
Kt
() R~s~t =
1
(1 + (1 + r)K~t)
P
(s;t)62C nst
24(1 + r) X
(s;t) 62C
nstIs  
X
(s;t)2C
nstIs
Kt
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for any (~s; ~t) 62 C. This is positive if and only if
(1 + r)
X
(s;t)62C
nstIs >
X
(s;t)2C
nstIs
Kt
: (2.18)
On the other hand, it must hold that 3st > 0 for (s; t) 2 C. By (2.16), for any (s; t) 2 C
and (s0; t0) 62 C, we have the following:
1 + 
Rs0t0
1
1 + (1 + r)Kt0
=

1 + 
Rst
  3st
nst

1
1 + (1 + r)Kt
)3st = nst(1 + )
 
Kt
Is
 
(1 + (1 + r)Kt)
P
(s;t) 62C n
s
t
(1 + r)
P
(s;t)62C n
s
tIs  
P
(s;t)2C(nstIs=Kt)
!
:
A sucient and necessary condition for 3st > 0 is
Kt
Is
>
(1 + (1 + r)Kt)
P
(s;t) 62C n
s
t
(1 + r)
P
(s;t)2C n
s
tIs  
P
(s;t)2C(nstIs=Kt)
() Is
Kt
(1 + (1 + r)Kt)
P
(s;t)62C n
s
t
(1 + r)
P
(s;t)2C n
s
tIs  
P
(s;t)2C(nstIs=Kt)
6 0
() (1 + r)
X
(s;t)62C
nstIs <
X
(s;t)2C
nstIs
Kt
(2.19)
Thus, (2.19) contradicts (2.18).
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By lemma, we can focus on an inner solution. Then by the complementary slackness
conditions, 3st = 0 for all (s; t) 2  and we can derive the relation (2.17) for any pair
(s; t), (s0; t0) 2 . Moreover, the feasibility condition is satised with equality by (2.16)
and 3st = 0. Substituting (2.17) to the feasibility condition, we have
Rst =
(1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
1 + (1 + r)Kt
for all (s; t) 2 . To derive Pst, substitute Rst to Pst = Is  KtRst. Then
Pst = Is  Kt
(1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
1 + (1 + r)Kt
=
[1 + (1 + r)Kt]Is  Kt(1 + r)nstIs  Kt(1 + r)
P
(s0;t0)6=(s;t) ns0t0Is0
1 + (1 + r)Kt
=
Is + (1 + r)Kt
P
(s0;t0)6=(s;t) ns0t0Is   (1 + r)Kt
P
(s0;t0)6=(s;t) ns0t0Is0
1 + (1 + r)Kt
=
Is + (1 + r)Kt
P
(s0;t0)6=(s;t) ns0t0(Is   Is0)
1 + (1 + r)Kt
:
We need to check whether consumers have incentive to untruthfully tell their degree
of temptation. Since their optimal plans that we have derived is determined on the locus
of st(st) = 1=(1 + r), one sucient condition for no-deviation is that plans for arbitrary
two consumers with the same income are on the same line with the gradient of 1=(1 + r).
Actually, this is satised.
Proposition 2.5.1. For any (s; t) and (s; t0), it holds that
Pst   Pst0
Rst  Rst0 =
1
1 + r
:
Proof. We calculate Rst  Rst0 and Pst   Pst0 in practice.
Rst  Rst0 =
(1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
1 + (1 + r)Kt
 
(1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
1 + (1 + r)Kt0
=
(1 + r)(Kt0  Kt)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
[1 + (1 + r)Kt][1 + (1 + r)Kt0 ]
;
Pst   Pst0 = (Is  KtRst)  (Is  K 0tRst0)
=
Kt0((1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s)
1 + (1 + r)Kt
 
Kt((1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s)
1 + (1 + r)Kt0
=
Kt0 [1 + (1 + r)Kt0 ] Kt[1 + (1 + r)Kt]
[1 + (1 + r)Kt][1 + (1 + r)Kt0 ]
X
(~s;~t)2
n~s~tI~s
=
(Kt0  Kt)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
[1 + (1 + r)Kt][1 + (1 + r)Kt0 ]
:
Hence, we have the intended result.
Therefore, we can conclude that the solution we have derived is not only for the problem
with complete information but also for the problem with incomplete information.
Theorem 2.5.1. In the unique optimal schedule, the plan of consumer with (Is; t) is
Rst =
(1 + r)
P
(~s;~t)2 n~s~tI~s
1 + (1 + r)Kt
Pst =
Is + (1 + r)Kt
P
(s0;t0)6=(s;t) ns0t0(Is   Is0)
1 + (1 + r)Kt
:
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Figure 2.6: An optimal schedule
Figure 2.6 shows an example of the optimal schedule when I = fI1; I2g and  =
f1; 2g. Four points are the elements of optimal schedule. Note that the consumers
can lie about only their degree of temptation. Thus the deviation that we have to think
is between (I1; 1) and (I1; 2) and between (I2; 1) and (I2; 2). We can see that the
deviation makes loss for any types.
The optimal schedule above has some characteristic property. First, clearly, this sched-
ule is the generalization of the result in the previous section with identical income. You
can see this by assuming I1 = I2 =    = Im in the plan for (s; t). Second, the pension
return is equivalent for two consumers if and only if their degree of temptation are equiv-
alent. That is, the determination of the amount of return depends only on the degree
of temptation and not on income. On the other hand, third, the payment for the pen-
sion fund depends both of income and the degree of temptation. Especially, consumers
with relatively higher income pay more amount, since the summation in the numerator of
Pst become larger when Is is high. This implies that there is a monetary transfer from
high-income consumers to low-income consumers through the dierences of payments.
2.6 Conclusion
We have considered optimally funded pensions for consumers who face the temptation
to overconsume and as well as for those who have enough self-control to withstand their
temptation. Since funded pensions tighten consumers' budgets , they can serve as com-
mitment devices to avoid overconsumption. We applied the pension to an economy in
which consumers have heterogeneous self-control. We showed that funded pensions can
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improve social welfare even if the interest rates they draw are the same as those for private
saving. In addition, consumers do not save individually when they choose the pension plan
that is optimal for them. Furthermore, interestingly, lower pension premium and lower
pension payout are applied for a higher temptation economy. This result is related to
borrowing constraints. In an identical-type economy, an increase in the premium leads
to increased pension income, and this augments possibility of debt. Since consumers are
tempted to overconsume, this works stronger for consumers who have strong temptations.
This eect is greater than the benet of strengthening the budget set. As a main result,
we have considered an optimal pension schedule when there exist two or more types in the
economy. In that situation, we show the necessary conditions for the optimal schedule. If
the normative utility function is a logarithm, it is characterized in the same way as that
for an economy with identical-type. We show that monetary transfer among types will
not occur for the optimal schedule. An important result is that the optimal schedule does
not depend on the distribution of types; that is, what the government has to know is only
what types are in the economy. This make the operation of the pension policy easier.
In the future research, we face many problems. In the latter half of this chapter,
we focused on the normative utility function as a logarithm. The rst thing to do is to
show that the result holds in a more general utility function. However, this challenge
contains an analytical problem. We have not found a way to solve the problem explicitly
for utility functions that are frequently used in economics, such as constant power, CRRA
and CARA. Some novel methods are needed to work out this point.
In addition, we restrict the policy to funded pensions. But pay-as-you-go pension can
be considered. By association, we can consider a model in which a consumer lives longer
than the two periods used in this study. Then it may be natural to assume a consumer
earns wages in each period. Moreover, if we assume multiple periods, consumers may have
the opportunity to change their pension plans in each period. It will be interesting to
see whether this change has a positive eect on social welfare. These problems may be
complex and challenging.
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Chapter 3
Consumer Inertia and Competitive
Behavior between Firms
3.1 Introduction
When we buy extremely expensive goods such as a house and a car, we probably check
the quality of them closely by making use of reviews in websites and word of mouth even
if the survey of quality is costly. On the other hand, we do not check the qualities of
inexpensive commodities. There are goods in the middle of these goods, which we have
a conict whether we do the survey or not. For example, each rm put out a new model
of smartphones seasonally. In Japan, average age of use is 2.0-3.8 years and about 40%
among the reasons of replacement are requirements for a high-end equipment.1 When we
replace these goods, in some vague way, we know the quality of a new product put out by
the rm whose product is currently used. Though we can look at specs of other products,
it is dicult to know actual quality unless we use them. Then, one option is to buy the
product of familiar rm with out the survey. Another option is to survey the qualities
of other product spending time and eort. It is not obvious whether consumers do the
survey, which depends on the magnitude of the survey cost and how much they set store
on the quality. We focus on the consumers' behavior of not surveying non-default product
even if it may have higher quality. We call this behavior inertia. Our purpose is to study
the inertial behaviors and price system which chosen in equilibria under inertia.
Some experimental and empirical studies show that individuals tend to choose their
status quo alternatives (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Frequently used concept
to explain the bias is loss aversion. This is one special case of reference dependence
preferences. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) formed a hypothesis that a value function is
dened on gains and losses and it is steeper for losses than for gains.2 It is well known
that this value function can explain the loss aversive behaviors of individuals. As an other
approach to the status quo bias, Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) proposed an rational choice
theory which allows the existence of status quo bias and includes a standard choice model
as a special case.
When consumers have default alternatives, their search of the prices and the qualities
of other products are likely to be limited when the search is costly. Armstrong et al.
(2009) studied the competition between rms when consumers are not completely informed
1Consumer Condence Survey, Cabinet Oce, Government of Japan (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/
jp/stat/shouhi/shouhi.html)
2Their one more hypothesis is that the value function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in
the domain of losses.
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about prices. In their model, the consumers decide whether to compare the prices or not
endogenously. Though they are likely to save the expenditure, they may not compare when
the comparison is costly. From the viewpoint of consumer protection policy, a government
can make the upper bound of the price. However, the policy may end up a bad eect for
consumers since it makes them feel ease and suppresses voluntary price comparisons.
We study the price competition between two rms. Each rm supplies one kind of
product. Their prices are completely observed by consumers but their qualities are private
information of the rm. Each consumer has his default option, which is one of the two
product. The interpretation is the new product by the rm whose old product is used by
the consumer. Each consumer can receive information about his default product without
cost. If he embraces the cost of survey, he can receive additional information about the
quality of non-default product. We investigate the eects of the ratio of default consumers
and the survey cost to the behaviors of the consumers and the rms.
The construction of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.2, we pose a formal model of
a market and check some basic property of the model. We consider two kinds of separating
equilibria. In section 3.3.1, we show that there is no separating equilibrium over qualities.
In section 3.3.2, we show that a separating equilibrium over costs can exist and study the
property of the equilibrium.
3.2 Model
There are two rms whom indexed by 1 and 2. Firm i = 1; 2 sells its product with quality
qi 2 fqL; qHg (where qL < qH). The cost for rm i to sell one unit of goods is ci. The
quality and the cost are exogenously given by the restriction of technology, which is private
information of rm i. Given them, each rm i chooses price pi. Ordinal price competition
models consider a continuous choice with using marginal analysis. However, we focus on
discrete price choice since the objective function of rms in our model is not dierentiable
and we cannot enjoy the benet of marginal analysis so much.
Consumers cannot observe directly the qualities of products and are risk averse for
them. Each consumer initially thinks one of products as default. Let i be the proportion
of consumers whose default is product i. Though consumers cannot observe qualities,
consumers whose default is i receive a signal i 2 fH ; Lg about qi exogenously. If a
consumer surveys about the quality of the product that is not her default, she can receive
an additional quality signal of it, where it costs her K > 0. For simplicity, we assume that
signals are common among consumers that receive them regardless of the timing. This
is alternatively implicated that consumers receive signals independently from identical
distributions. Additionally, we assume that all consumers buy exactly one product. The
prior distribution of qualities for any rm i is Pr[qi = qH ] = aq 2 (0; 1) and signals are
informative, that is, Pr[H j qH ]  rHH > 1=2 and Pr[L j qL]  rLL > 1=2. The prior
distribution of cost for any rm i is Pr[cH ] = ac 2 (0; 1).
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Each rm learns its quality of the product and chooses price simultaneously.
2. Each consumer observes prices of all products and the quality of her default product.
3. Consumers decide whether she surveys the quality of another product. If she did,
she receives its signal.
4. Consumers decide which product to buy.
32
Consumers evaluate the qualities of products dierently for each.  2 [0; 1] denote the
valuations. We assume that the expected utility functions of consumers are quasi-linear,
that is,
u(x; ) = E[
p
qi   pi j i; p] = E[pqi j i; p]  pi
if the default product of a consumer is i and she buy it and
u(xj ; ) = E[
p
qj   pj j p] = E[pqj j p]  pj
if she buy product j without searching the quality, where p = (p1; p2). For a simplicity,
we assume that each consumer chooses default product if u(xi; ) = u(xj ; ).
3.3 Equilibria
3.3.1 Separation over qualities
Consider the following strategy of the rms:
p(q; c) =
(
pH if q = qH
pL if q = qL;
where pH > pL. When the rms follows this strategy, consumers can distinguish the
quality of the rm. Then no consumer inquires about the quality of non-default product.
In this case, default has a meaning on the decision when the both products are indierence.
We can derive a demand for each pair of price easily. Let Di(pi; pj) be the demand
for the product i when the rms i and j choose prices pi and pj , respectively. If the both
rms choose the same price, the demand for arbitrary product i is i since the same prices
implies the same quality. If the rm i chooses pH and the rm j chooses pL, the condition
for consumers to buy the product i is,

p
qH   pH > pqL   pL ()  > pH   pLp
qH  pqL :
Note that the right hand side of this inequality is not necessary smaller than 1. Thus the
demand for the product i is 1  min
n
pH pLp
qH 
p
qL
; 1
o
and the demand for the product j is
min
n
pH pLp
qH 
p
qL
; 1
o
.
Given these consumers' behaviors, we consider the condition for the rms do not
deviate the strategy. Since each rm does not know the quality of the opponent before
choosing the price, it thinks of the expected prot with respect to the probability aq.
In fact, this class of strategy is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3.1. For any i, the situation that both rms play the strategy
s(q; c) =
(
pH if q = qH
pL if q = qL
cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. Fix arbitrary i 2 (0; 1). The rm of type (qH ; cH) does not deviate if
(pH   cH)

aqDi(pH ; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pH ; pL)

> (pL   cH)

aqDi(pL; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pL; pL)

:
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The left hand side is the expected prot when the rm i chooses pH and the other side is
the expected prot when it chooses pL. The rm of type (qL; cH) does not deviate if
(pL   cH)

aqDi(pL; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pL; pL)

> (pH   cH)

aqDi(pH ; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pH ; pL)

:
Getting together these conditions, we have
(pH   cH)

aqDi(pH ; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pH ; pL)

= (pL   cH)

aqDi(pL; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pL; pL)

() pH

aqDi(pH ; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pH ; pL)
  pLaqDi(pL; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pL; pL)
= cH [aq fDi(pH ; pH) Di(pL; pH)g+ (1  aq) fDi(pH ; pL) Di(PL; pL)g] (3.1)
By no-deviation conditions for the rm of type (qH ; cL) and (qL; cL), similarly, we can
derive that
pH

aqDi(pH ; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pH ; pL)
  pLaqDi(pL; pH) + (1  aq)Di(pL; pL)
= cL [aq fDi(pH ; pH) Di(pL; pH)g+ (1  aq) fDi(pH ; pL) Di(PL; pL)g] : (3.2)
Since the left hand sides of (3.1) and (3.2) are identical, it holds that
cH [aq fDi(pH ; pH) Di(pL; pH)g+ (1  aq) fDi(pH ; pL) Di(PL; pL)g]
= cL [aq fDi(pH ; pH) Di(pL; pH)g+ (1  aq) fDi(pH ; pL) Di(PL; pL)g]
() cH = cL:
This contradicts the assumption that cH > cL.
3.3.2 Separation over costs
Let us consider the following strategy of the rms:
s(q; c) =
(
pH if c = cH
pL if c = cL;
where pH > pL. A price chosen by a rm can be a signal of the cost of the rm. On
the other hand, it has no information about the quality. Actually, the prediction of the
quality by consumers after observing the price is
Pr[qH j pH ] = aqac
aqaC + (1  aq)ac = aq
Pr[qH j pL] = aq(1  ac)
aq(1  ac) + (1  aq)(1  ac) = aq
This implies a quality survey may be benecial for the consumers. In what follows, we
derive a demand for each pair of prices. At rst, we check up which product is chosen by
a consumer whose default is i in each case, that is, a case without a survey, a case with
survey and received j = H and a case with survey and received j = L. Then, we see
whether the consumer surveys with comparing expected utility when she does not survey
and that when she does.
When pi = pj , the decisions of the consumers depend only on the expected qualities of
products. If a consumer whose default product is i received i = H , she necessarily buy i
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since product j's expected quality cannot be strictly larger than i's regardless of whether
she surveys the quality of j and what signals she received about j when she surveyed.
Therefore, she chooses product i without the survey if i = H . On the other hand, she
may choose i even if i = L. This is because both products are indierent when j = L.
In other cases, in which she does not survey j's quality and in which she did survey and
received j = H , she buys j. The following condition describe the decision whether the
survey is done:
[rLHaq + rLL(1  aq)]| {z }
Pr[L]

rLHaq
p
qH + rLL(1  aq)pqL
rLHaq + rLL(1  aq)
+ [rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)]| {z }
Pr[H ]

rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH  K
> [aq
p
qH + (1  aq)pqL]  pH ;
where Pr[L] and Pr[H ] are the prior probabilities of consumers' signal. Actually, this
inequality implies K 6 0, which contradicts K > 0. Therefore, having received i = L,
she chooses j without the survey.
Next we consider the case in which the rms choose dierent prices. Let pi = pH and
pj = pL. If a consumer receives i = H , the expected utility of product i is
E[
p
qi   pH j H ] = 
rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH :
Thus she buys i when the survey of j's quality is not carried out if

rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH > [aq
p
qH + (1  aq)pqL]  pL
()  > Pr[H ](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)  HL:
Suppose that the consumer does the survey and receives j = H . In this case, the
expectation of quality are identical but product j is strictly less expensive than i, so she
buys j. If j = L, the product chosen by the consumer is not apparent. She buys i if

rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH > 
rLHaq
p
qH + rLL(1  aq)pqL
rLHaq + rLL(1  aq)   pL
()  > Pr[H ][rLHaq + rLL(1  aq)](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)  :
Lemma 3.3.1. It holds that  < HL.
Proof. By the denitions of HL   ,
HL    = Pr[H ](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) [1  (rLHaq + rLL(1  aq))]
=
Pr[H ](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) [rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)] > 0:
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Figure 3.1: Decision by the consumer whose default is i when pi = pH and pj = pL.
Figure 3.1 depicts the consumption by the consumer whose default is i. We can see
that consumers with  <  do not survey since the choice does not change between before
and after the survey. Intuitively, these consumers care of the price rather than the quality.
Consumers with  such that  <  < HL may change their choice after observing the
result of survey. Following this decision rule, their expected utilities of survey are
[rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)]


rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pL

+ [rLHaq + rLL(1  aq)]


rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH

 K
= 
rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)
  (rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))pL   (rLHaq + rLL(1  aq))pH  K: (3.3)
Then the condition for them to do a survey is

rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)
  (rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))pL   (rLHaq + rLL(1  aq))pH  K
> [aq
p
qH + (1  aq)pqL]  pL
()  > Pr[H ] [Pr[L](pH   pL) +K]
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)  
S
HL:
Lemma 3.3.2. There are consumers who do a survey in a range  <  < HL if and only
if K < (rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))(pH   pL).
Proof. It should be proven that  < SHL < HL. At rst, we show that 
S
HL >  for any
K > 0. Choose arbitrary K > 0. By the denitions of SHL and ,
SHL    =
Pr[H ] [Pr[L](pH   pL) +K]
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
  Pr[H ] Pr[L](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
=
K
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) > 0:
Next we show that SHL < HL if and only if K < (rHHaq + rHL(1   aq))(pH   pL). By
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the denitions of SHL and HL, we have
Pr[H ](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
>
Pr[H ] [Pr[L](pH   pL) +K]
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  
p
qL)
() K < (rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))(pH   pL): (3.4)
Next we consider the consumers with  > HL. In this case, the decision after a survey
is the same as the one in previous case. Thus the consumer surveys if

rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)
  (rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))pL   (rLHaq + rLL(1  aq))pH  K
> rHHaq
p
qH + rHL(1  aq)pqL
rHHaq + rHL(1  aq)   pH
() K 6 Pr[H ](pH   pL):
Note that this is identical to (3.4). Hence we can conclude this case as follows.
Lemma 3.3.3. Assume that pi = pH , pj = pL and i = H . Then there exist consumers
whose default is i, who surveys the quality of j if and only if K 6 (rHHaq + rHL(1  
aq))(pH   pL).
If the condition for K is not satised, no consumer does a survey. Especially, then
consumers with  > HL buy default product, which is more expensive than non-default
one. This means the height of survey cost leads them to inertial behavior. Additionally,
since the threshold depends on the dierence between pH and pL, the inertial behavior is
likely to occur in a market in which rms choose similar prices.
Let i = L. In this case, the expectation of quality of product i is lower than that of
j that is neutrally predicted. In addition, product i is expensive than j. Therefore, the
consumers whose default is i choose j without a survey.
Similar discussion holds for the case in which pi = pL and pj = pH . The consumption
decision is depicted in Figure 3.2, where LH is dened to be
LH  Pr[L](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) ;
which is the solution of the equation that i and j are indierent when a survey is not
carried out. The denition of  is the same as above and it satises the following property.
Lemma 3.3.4. It holds that LH > .
Proof. By the denitions of LH and , their dierence is
LH    = Pr[L](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
  Pr[H ] Pr[L](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
=
(1  Pr[H ]) Pr[L](pH   pL)
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) :
Since Pr[H ] is smaller than 1, this dierence is strictly positive.
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Figure 3.2: Decision by the consumer whose default is i when pi = pL and pj = pH .
If  6 , the consumer chooses i without a survey since her choice does not change
before and after the survey. For  such that  <  6 LH , consumers do a survey if
 > SLH , where
SLH 
Pr[L]

Pr[H ](pH   pL) +K

aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) :
SLH is always bigger than  and it is smaller than LH if and only if K 6 (rLHaq +
rLL(1  aq))(pH   pL). This is equivalent to the condition for the existence of consumers
who survey when  > LH . Thus, as in lemma 3.3.3, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3.3.5. Assume that pi = pL, pj = pH and i = L. Then there exist consumers
whose default is i, who surveys the quality of j if and only if K 6 (rLHaq + rLL(1  
aq))(pH   pL).
Let us see the relations between HL and LH and between 
R
HL and 
R
LH .
Lemma 3.3.6. For any K > 0, the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) HL > LH
(ii) SHL > 
S
LH
(iii) Pr[H ] > Pr[L]
Proof. Suppose that HL > LH . This implies that
HL   LH = (pH   pL) fPr[H ]  Pr[L]g
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL) > 0
() Pr[H ] > Pr[L]:
Thus (i) and (iii) are equivalent. Next suppose that SHL > 
S
LH . This implied that
SHL   SLH =
K
aq(1  aq)(rHH + rLL   1)(pqH  pqL)
 f(rHHaq + rHL(1  aq))  (rLHaq + rLL(1  aq))g > 0
() rLL(1  aq)  rLHaq < 1
2
:
Thus (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. Therefore, (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
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Figure 3.3: Choices by consumes when K is suciently small, pi = pH and pj = pL.
The left hand side of (iii) in the statement is a probability with which consumers
receives L. That is, if the consumers expect that the survey is likely to bring them H ,
SLH , the threshold of survey for consumers whose default is low price product, is lower
than SHL.
Firms choose their price expecting the demand in light of the consumer behaviors
discussed above. At rst, we derive an expected demand when pi = pj . In this case,
the decisions of consumers depend only on the signals they received as default. Among
consumers whose default is i, those who received i = H choose i. And among consumers
whose default is j, those who receive j = L choose j. Since rm i knows its quality, the
prediction of its signal as a conditional probability, that is, Pr[H j qi] = rHH if qi = qH
and Pr[L j qi] = rLH if qi = qL. On the other hand, the prediction of signal of opponent
cannot be updated since the quality of the opponent is unknown. Therefore, demands in
this case is derived as follows
Di(pH ; pH ; qi) = Di(pL; pL; qi) = i Pr[H j qi] + j Pr[L]:
Next we derive demands when pi 6= pj . Figure 3.3 is useful to see the consumers'
behavior. Lower (resp. upper) part of the gure corresponds to consumers whose default
is product i (resp. j). Each of them are divided by a default signal received. Additionally,
consumers who does a survey are divided by a signal received as a result of the survey.
We can see that  itself does not divide the behavior of any consumers. It is, actually, the
common lower bound of SHL and 
S
LH .
Since  is uniformly distributed, demands are calculated as areas of corresponding
parts. Note that each threshold of  is not necessarily smaller than 1. Thus, the demands
39
of product i when pi 6= pj is
Di(pH ; pL; qi) = i Pr[H j qi] Pr[L](1 minfSHL; 1g)
+ j Pr[L] Pr[H j qi]
 
1 minfSLH ; 1g

= Pr[H j qi] Pr[L]
 
1  iminfSHL; 1g   j minfSLH ; 1g

Di(pL; pH ; qi) = 1  i Pr[L j qi] Pr[H ](1 minfSLH ; 1g)
  j Pr[H ] Pr[L j qi](1 minfSHL; 1g)
= 1  Pr[L j qi] Pr[H ]
 
1  iminfSLH ; 1g   j minfSHL; 1g

:
At rst, We consider the case of SHL > 
S
LH . We derive relationship of pL and pH that can
let the strategy be an equilibrium for each case, 1 6 SLH , SLH < 1 6 SHL and SHL < 1.
Firms deviate the strategy if the deviation yields them more expected prot. Thus
conditions for rm i with type (qt; cH) (t 2 fH;Lg) not to deviate is written as follows 3:
(pH   cH) [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
> (pL   cH) [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)] ;
() pH [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
  pL [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)]
> cH [(1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)  acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (2ac   1)Di(pH ; pH ; qt)] ; (3.5)
and the condition for rm i with type (qt; cL) is
(pL   cL) [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)]
> (pH   cL) [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
() pH [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
  pL [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)]
6 cL [(1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)  acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (2ac   1)Di(pH ; pH ; qt)] : (3.6)
To simplify, let Xt (t 2 fH;Lg) be a part that is multiplied to cH and cL in the right hand
sides of (3.5) and (3.6), respectively. Here we have a property about expected revenue in
the equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3.2. In the equilibrium, the expected revenue of high cost rm is weakly
smaller than that of low cost rm.
Proof. Combining (3.5) and (3.6), we have
cHXt 6 pH [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
  pL [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)] 6 cLXt:
By cH > cL, Xt must be weakly smaller than 0. Middle of the inequality is the dierence
between expected revenue when pi = pH , which is chosen by high cost rm, and that when
pi = pL, which is chosen by low cost rm. Because left and right hand sides are negative,
the middle is also negative, that is, this inequality requires that low cost farm yields more
expected revenue than high cost rm in the equilibrium.
3Note that Di(pH ; pH ; qt) = Di(pL; pL; qt).
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Figure 3.4: Pairs of prices satisfying no-deviation conditions
To obtain the properties of conditions, for t, s 2 fH;Lg, we dene functions Fts : R2 !
R as follows:
Fts(pH ; pL)  (pH   cs) [acDi(pH ; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pH ; pL; qt)]
  (pL   cs) [acDi(pL; pH ; qt) + (1  ac)Di(pL; pL; qt)]
Then, if Fts(pH ; pL) = 0 for some pairs of prices (pH ; pL), choosing pH and choosing pL
are indierent for the rm with (qt; cs). Additionally, let fts : R++ ! R be a function such
that Fts(pH ; fts(pH)) = 0.
Lemma 3.3.7. For any t, s 2 fH;Lg, fts has a xed point pts = cs.
Proof. Fix arbitrary t; s 2 fH;Lg. Since expected demand is non-negative, if pH = pL =
pts = cs, we have F (pts; pts) = 0, that is, pts = fts(pts) by the denition of fts. Therefore
pts is a xed point of fts.
This lemma states that the locus of (pH ; pL) passes thorough the 45 degree line and
the intersection point depends only on the cost.
Figure 3.4 illustrates an example of area in which no-deviation conditions are satised.
Each four curves represents pairs of prices such that the condition for each type is satised
with equality, that is, they are fts. The curves for the same cost crosses on the 45 degree
line at the value of the cost because of lemma 3.3.7. Arrows indicates the direction that the
condition is satised. In shadowed area, all conditions hold. You can see that maximal
pH that can be a equilibrium is pH = cL. Since pH > pL, this implies the following
proposition.
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Proposition 3.3.3. In this separating equilibrium, no rm can earn positive prot.
3.4 Conclusion
We have studied consumers' inertial behaviors and their endogenous information acquisi-
tions. The quality and the cost of each rm are private information of the rm. Firms can
send a signal about the information as the price. Each consumer has a default product
and receives information about the quality of it more than other product. It costs them
to receive additional information about non-default product. In this model, we analyzed
two kinds of separation equilibria. The rst one is separated over qualities. We that this
equilibrium does not exist. The second one is separated over costs. It is found that the
equilibrium can exist for the specic pairs of prices and no rm can earn positive prot in
the equilibrium.
There are some problems. For example, so far it is unapparent that the eect of
number of existing customer to rms' behavior. To analyze this point, we will consider a
strategy that directly depends on the share of default consumers. Intuitively, it is natural
that the rm with large share has strong attitude if the competition is one-shot. However,
it is not necessarily obvious since the default consumers are likely to survey when the price
is much higher than other product.
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Chapter 4
The Economic Analysis of
Psychological Reactance
4.1 Introduction
A worker has two projects A and B, and will choose which of these to execute. As a result
of consideration in light of his experience in the eld, he decided to promote project A.
Then his new adviser headhunted recently came and told the worker to promote project
A. The worker, who believed that he had more precise information than his adviser, is
hostile to the advice and nally chose project B.
Like this example, there are situations in which a nal chooser is reactive to persuasion
that promote some actions even if they are actions that the chooser decided to choose
originally. In psychology, this phenomenon is called psychological reactance. From Brehm
(1966), literature that proposed this concept, a great number of experiments are done in
various situations.
In fact, psychological reactance is broader concept than the example above. Brehm
(1966) explain this phenomenon by the restoration of threatened freedom to choose. Note
that "threatened" does not necessary mean that it disappears materially but means that
some barriers' to choice emergent. In the example, the worker's freedom to choose by his
own thought does not disappear but it is threatened by the advice of his adviser.
We study psychological reactance from the viewpoint of economics. To do this, we
focus on the situation like the rst example. Two players, adviser and chooser, face to
the choice of alternative. Though one of this commonly benets them, both players do
not completely know which is the right alternative. Each player values alternatives using
noisy signal. No one knows whether the precision of the chooser is higher than the adviser
or not. The key of our model is the chooser's preference for high reputation. He wishes to
be seen by the adviser that he has high precision. In addition, he values marginal increase
of the reputation higher when the reputation is lower than his self-evaluation, that is,
he has reference dependent preference, as seen in Tversky and Kahneman (1991), with
self-evaluation as reference point. Intuitively, he does not like over-evaluation.
Levy (2004) investigates anti-herding behavior in the situation of career concern.
Though the most basic setting of our model is like their model, there are some dier-
ences. In our model, we assume that the precisions of the chooser is discrete, whereas
Levy (2004) assume continuous precision. We probably be able to extend our model
about this point. A next dierence is the chooser's knowledge about his precision. Levy
(2004) assume that the chooser knows his own precision. In our model, however, it is
uncertain even for himself. This implies that the advice of adviser aects not only to the
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expectation of the reputation of the chooser's precision, but also his self-evaluation. Then
the adviser chooses her action with considering this eect. Additionally, the feature of our
model is the reference dependence of evaluation of reputation as stated above.
The construction of this chapter is as follows. In section 4.2, we propose the basic
framework of our model. Then in 4.2.1, we investigate an equilibrium in which the reactive
behavior of the chooser comes about.
4.2 Discrete Precision Model
We consider a game with two players, an adviser (A) and a chooser (C). There are two
alternatives, 0 and 1. Just one of these is a right alternative. \Right" means that it yields
higher material payo to both players than the other. x 2 f0; 1g denotes right alternative
and rk 2 (0; 1) denotes a probability with which right alternative is k 2 f0; 1g. Though
both do not completely knows which is the right alternative, i 2 fA;Cg receives signals
si independently. We call them alternative signals. The alternative signal precision of the
adviser is qA 2 (1=2; 1) and this is common knowledge. qA represents a probability that
adviser receives alternative signal correctly, that is,
qA  Pr[sA = x j x]:
On the other hand, the alternative signal precision of chooser, qC , is qH 2 (1=2; 1) in one
case and in other case, it is qL 2 (1=2; 1). The denitions of qH and qL are the same as
qA. We assume that qL < qA < qH . So the adviser knows that there exists the case in
which the chooser has higher precision about the right alternative. For k 2 fH;Lg, let
k 2 (0; 1) be the prior probability with which qC is qk. Both players do not completely
know which precision are realized but they independently receive signals about chooser's
precision. We call them precision signals and qCi denotes a precision signal that player
i 2 fA;Cg receives. The precision of precision signal of player i 2 fA;Cg is "i 2 (0; 1=2).
This represents the probability with which player i receives precision signal incorrectly,
that is,
"i  Pr[qCi 6= qC j qC ]:
We do not consider mixed strategy. The set of actions that the adviser can choose is
f0; 1; g. 0 (1) represents an advice \you had better choose 0 (1)".  represents saying
nothing. Let a 2 f0; 1; g be the action of the adviser. The adviser chooses one action
after observing her signals, qCA and sA. The strategy of the adviser is a function that
maps (qCA; sA) to a.
The set of actions that the chooser can choose is simply f0; 1g. An outcome depends
on the choice c 2 f0; 1g. The chooser chooses one action after observing qCC , sA and
advice a. The strategy of the chooser is a function that maps (qCC ; sA; a) to c.
The adviser is interested in material payo that is yielded by the chooser's action and
right alternative. Let the material payo when the chooser chose right alternative be 1
and one when he did not choose right alternative be 0. Then the payo of the adviser is
simply the probability with which the chooser chooses right alternative.
The chooser also be interested in material. In addition, he cares about his image by
the adviser. He wishes to be seen as he has high precision of alternative signal. He has
self-image and he especially wants to avoid to seen lower than it. Formally, let bC(a; qCC)
be a self-image of the chooser and this is dened to be,
bc(a; sC ; qCC)  Pr[qC = qH j a; sC ; qCC ]:
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Note that bC depends on sC . Intuitively, let the strategy of the adviser be a = sA, then,
if the chooser observes qCC = qL and sC 6= a, his alternative signal is more likely to be
wrong. This causes decreasing in bC .
Next let bA(a; c) be the chooser's prediction of \ex-post prediction of adviser's image
to the chooser", that is,
bA(a; c) = Pr[qC = qH j a; c]:
There are two points to note. The rst is that since bA depends on c, the chooser can
aect the image by the adviser through c. The second is that bA is independent on sC , sA,
qCC , and qCA. This is because the adviser cannot use qCC and sC to make the prediction
and the chooser cannot use qCA and sA to make the prediction of prediction. A function
v represents the psychological payo by the these images.
We dene v to be
v(bA; bC) =
(
h(bA   bC) if bA > bC
bA   bC otherwise
;
where h 2 (0; 1). That is, v has a loss aversion form with reference point bC . The whole
payo of the chooser is weighted sum of material and psychological payo,
Pr[x = c j a; c; qCC ; sC ] + v(bA; bC):
4.2.1 Equilibrium
We consider the following strategies:
Adviser:(
a =  if qCA = qH
a = sA if qCA = qL
(4.1)
Chooser:8><>:
c = sC if a = 
c = a if a 6=  and qCC = qL
c 6= a if a 6=  and qCC = qH :
(4.2)
The adviser advises to the chooser when he has lower precision in order to avoid his wrong
choice. On the other hand, if she predicts that the chooser has higher precision, she thinks
better to leave the chooser to do what he likes. If the chooser follows this strategy, there
exists a case in which he chooses c 6= sA even if he chooses the same action as sA if
the adviser says nothing. This is the psychological reactance. We show that this pair of
strategies can be an equilibrium.
Consider the adviser's behavior. She is interested in the subjective probability with
which the chooser chooses right alternative. For example, the probability when she ob-
served qCA = qL and sA = 0 and she chose a = 0 is
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] =
L(1  "A)(1  "C)r0qA + L(1  "A)"Cr1(1  qA)
+H"A"Cr0qA + H"A(1  "C)r1(1  qA)
L(1  "A)r0qA + L(1  "A)r1(1  qA)
+H"Ar0qA + H"Ar1(1  qA)
:
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When the chooser follows the above strategy, he chooses 0 if qCC = qL and 1 if
qCC = qH . The rst and second terms in the denominator are the sum of the probabilities
with which the true precision of the chooser is qL and the adviser observes it correctly.
The third and fourth terms in the denominator correspond to the case of the true precision
is qH and the adviser observes it incorrectly. Each term in the numerator contains the
factor of the observation of the chooser, "C and (1  "C).
If the adviser chooses a = , the choice of the chooser depends on the alternative signal
he observes. For example, the subjective probability with which the chooser chooses right
alternative when qCA = qH , sA = 0 and a = 0 is,
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] =
L"Ar0qAqL + L"Ar1(1  qA)qL
+H(1  "A)r0qAqH + H(1  "A)r1(1  qA)qH
L"Ar0qA + L"Ar1(1  qA)
+H(1  "A)r0qA + H(1  "A)r1(1  qA)
:
Henceforth, we assume that r0 = r1 = 1=2, that is, there is no bias in prior of right
alternative. For simplicity, we dene   "C(1   qA) + (1   "C)qA. The, obviously,
(1  "C)(1  qA) + "CqA = 1  . In addition, the following property is satised.
Lemma 4.2.1. For any qA 2 (1=2; qH) and "C 2 (0; 1=2), 1=2 <  < qH .
Proof. Choose "C 2 (0; 1=2) arbitrarily. Then the derivative of  for qA is 1   2"C > 0.
Easily we can check that
lim
qA!1=2

1
2
  

= 0
and
lim
qA!qH
(qH   ) = 2qH   "C > 0:
Therefore, we have 1=2 <  < qH for any qA 2 (1=2; qH).
Using this notation and assuming r0 = r1 = 1=2, the probabilities above are rewritten
as
Pr[c = x j qCA; sA = 0; a = 0] = L(1  "A) + H"A(1  )
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] = L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A) :
The probability of right choice under other conditions are in appendix A.1.
The conditions for the adviser's obeying the strategy are as follows:
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 0] (4.3)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 1] (4.4)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 0] (4.5)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 1] (4.6)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 1] (4.7)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = ] (4.8)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 1] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 0] (4.9)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 1] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = ] (4.10)
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Note that the prior probability of right alternative is neutral and 0 and 1 yields the same
utility as long as it is the right, we can use some kind of symmetry on these conditional
probabilities. Actually, (4.3) and (4.6), (4.4) and (4.5), (4.7) and (4.9), (4.8) and (4.10)
are equivalent, respectively. Thus, we consider (4.3), (4.4), (4.7) and (4.8).
At rst, substituting the probabilities in the both sides of (4.3), we have,
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 0]
() L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A) >
L"A + H(1  "A)(1  )
L"A + H(1  "A)
() L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH > L"A + H(1  "A)(1  )
() L"A
H(1  "A) 6
   (1  qH)
   qL : (4.11)
Similarly, (4.4) is,
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 1]
() L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A) >
L"A(1  ) + H(1  "A)
L"A + H(1  "A)
() L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH > L"A(1  ) + H(1  "A)
()    qH
   (1  qL) 6
L"A
H(1  "A) :
Since the left hand side of this is strictly negative by lemma 4.2.1 and the other side is
strictly positive, we can ignore this condition. Hence (4.11) is the condition for the adviser
to interfere the chooser when she observed qCA = qH . H and qH represent how much the
chooser is worse to trust, so increases of these make the condition be easy to be satised.
Next we check up conditions for the adviser to advise the chooser when she observed
qCA = qL. (4.7) is
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 1]
() L(1  "A) + H"A(1  )
L(1  "A) + H"A >
L(1  "A)(1  ) + H"A
L(1  "A) + H"A
() H"A
L(1  "A) 6 1: (4.12)
And (4.8) is
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] > Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = ]
() L(1  "A) + H"A(1  )
L(1  "A) + H"A >
L(1  "A)qL + H"AqH
L(1  "A) + H"A
() H"A
L(1  "A) 6
   qL
   (1  qH) : (4.13)
In fact, (4.13) is the sucient condition of (4.12) since qL > 1   qH by the assumption.
Thus, the adviser tells her alternative signal to the chooser when (4.13) is satised and
she observed qCA = qL. Large L and small qL mean that the chooser tends to have low
precision and the adviser will have an incentive to advise.
The following lemma summarizes above.
Lemma 4.2.2. The adviser follows the strategy if and only if
L"A
H(1  "A) 6
   (1  qH)
   qL and
H"A
L(1  "A) 6
   qL
   (1  qH) : (4.14)
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The following denitions simplies the notations.
H  H"A; L  L(1  "A)
qij  qiqj + (1  qi)(1  qj)
qij  qiqj   (1  qi)(1  qj) = qi + qj   1
q0ij  qi(1  qj) + (1  qi)qj
q0ij  qi(1  qj)  (1  qi)qj = qi   qj
Lemma 4.2.3. qAH > qAL and q
0
AL > q
0
AH if qH > qL.
Proof. By the denitions of qAH and qAL,
qAH   qAL = qAqH + (1  qA)(1  qH)  fqAqL   (1  qA)(1  qL)g
= qA(qH   qL) + (1  qA)(qH   qL) = qH   qL > 0;
and
q0AL   q0AH = qA(1  qL) + (1  qA)qL   fqA(1  qH) + (1  qA)qHg
= qA(qH   qL)  (1  qA)(qH   qL) = (2qA   1)(qH   qL) > 0
since qA > 1=2.
From here, we consider the condition that assures that the chooser follows the strategy.
To see the decision of the chooser, we need to check up three predictions by the chooser:
which is the right alternative, how much precise he is (bC) and what prediction the adviser
will have on the chooser's precision after observing his choice (bA). Information that the
chooser can use are qCC , sC and a. Under these information, the predictions are formed.
Consider the prediction of the right alternative. As an example, the probability of
x = 0 after observing a = 0, sC = 0 and qCC = qH is,
Pr[x = 0 j x = 0; a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]
=
H"A(1  "C)r0qAqH + L(1  "A)"Cr0qAqL
H"A(1  "C)r0qAqH + H"A(1  "C)r1(1  qA)(1  qH)
+L(1  "A)"Cr0qAqL + L(1  "A)"Cr1(1  qA)(1  qL)
=
H(1  "C)qAqH + L"CqAqL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL :
Note that the advice a 6=  implies that qCA = qL and sA = a in the equilibrium. On the
other hand, a =  is a signal that passes along only qCA = qH . The predictions under
other conditions are in appendix A.2.
Next we consider the posterior of qC = qH after observing (a; sC ; qCC). We write this
as bC(a; sC ; H) (bC(a; sC ; L)) if qCC = qH (qCC = qL). We can interpret this as a self-
condence of the chooser. It is worth to note that this depends on sC and sA indirectly.
For example, when the chooser observed qCC = qL, sC = 0 and a = 0, he may revise up
the posterior since the adviser, who has comparatively high precision, observed the same
alternative signal as him. In this case, the posterior is,
bC(0; 0; L)
=
H"A"Cr0qAqH + H"A"Cr1(1  qA)(1  qH)
H"A"Cr0qAqH + H"A"Cr1(1  qA)(1  qH)
+L(1  "A)(1  "C)r0qAqL + L(1  "A)(1  "C)r1(1  qA)(1  qL)
=
H"CqAH
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL :
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The posteriors for other observations are in appendix A.3.
Finally, we derive the chooser's predictions of posterior of qC by the adviser. These
represent the prediction of his feeling by the adviser. Though the chooser cannot use sA
and qCA and the adviser cannot use sC and qCC directly, their actions, a and c, can play
a role as the signals of these information. When a = 0, for example, the chooser sees that
he is seen to have a low precision by the adviser. To this, he can argue that his precision
is high by choosing c = 1, which is contrary to the advice. In this case, bA(0; 0) is
bA(0; 0) =
H"A"Cr0qA + H"A"Cr1(1  qA)
H"A"Cr0qA + H"A"Cr1(1  qA)
+L(1  "A)(1  "C)r0qA + L(1  "A)(1  "C)r1(1  qA)
= H"CH"C+L(1 "C) :
By the symmetric property of alternatives, bA(1; 1) is the same as this.
Similarly, we can obtain the beliefs in other cases as
bA(0; 1) = bA(1; 0) =
H(1  "C)
H(1  "C) + L"C :
We now check that the reactive behavior of the chooser can revise up the reputation
by the adviser.
Lemma 4.2.4. It holds that bA(0; 1) > bA(0; 0) and bA(1; 0) > bA(1; 1).
Proof. By the assumption, "C < 1=2. Then we have
1  2"C + "2C > "2C () H(1  "C)"C + L(1  "C)2 > H(1  "C)"C + L"2C
() H(1  "C)
H(1  "C) + L"C >
H"C
H"C + L(1  "C) :
Thus, we have bA(0; 1) > bA(0; 0) and bA(1; 0) > bA(1; 1).
The intuition is as follows. "C < 1=2 implies that the chooser is likely to receive his
precision signal correctly. The chooser following the strategy chooses reactive choice, that
is, c 6= a for a 6=  only if he received qCC = qH . Thus his choice plays a role as signal
that his precision is high, which revises up the reputation.
We derive the condition under that the chooser follows the strategy. At rst, let us
consider the condition to choose c = 1 for a = 0, sC = 0 and qCC = qH . If he chooses
c = 1,
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 0; H) =   HL(1  "C)"C(qAH   qAL)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
 :
If he deviates and chooses c = 0,
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 0; H) =  
HL

(1  "C)2qAH   "2CqAL

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
 :
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Since both are strictly negative, v values them with a weight . Then, the condition is
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] + 
 
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 0;H)

> Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] + 
 
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 0;H)

() H(1  "C)(1  qA)(1  qH) + L"C(1  qA)(1  qL)
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
   HL(1  "C)"C(qAH   qAL)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL

> H(1  "C)qAqH + L"CqAqL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
   HL

(1  "C)2qAH   "2CqAL

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL

()  > H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H(1  "C)qAH + L"C qAL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL 
H"C + L(1  "C)
1  2"C :
(4.15)
The condition to choose c = 1 for a = 1, sC = 0 and qCC = qL is the same as this by the
symmetry.
Next we consider the condition to choose c = 0 for a = 0, sC = 1 and qCC = qL. In
this case, the deferences of bA and bC are
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 1;H) = H(1  "C)
H(1  "C) + L"C  
H(1  "C)q0AH
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cs0AL
=
H(1  "C)L"C(q0AL   q0AH)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 1;H) = H"C
H"C + L(1  "C)  
H(1  "C)q0AH
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
=
HL

"2Cq
0
AL   (1  "C)2q0AH

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
 :
These are strictly positive, so v values them with weight h. Thus the condition is
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qL] + h
 
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 1; L)

> Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; qC = 1; qCC ] + h
 
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 1; L)

() H"CqA(1  qH) + L(1  "C)qA(1  qL)
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
+ h
HL"C(1  "C)(q0AL   q0AH)
H"C + L(1  "C)

H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL

> H"C(1  qA)qH + L(1  "C)(1  qAqL)
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
+ h
HL

(1  "C)2q0AL   "2Cq0AH

H(1  "C) + L"C

H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL

()  6 H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H"C q
0
AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
 H"C + L(1  "C)
1  2"C 
1
h
: (4.16)
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This is the same as the condition to choose c = 1 for a = 1, sC = 0 and qCC = qL.
Next we consider the condition to choose c = 1 for a = 0, sC = 1 and qCC = qH . The
dierences of beliefs are
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 1;H) = H(1  "C)
H(1  "C) + L"C  
H(1  "C)q0AH
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cs0AL
=
H(1  "C)L"C(q0AL   q0AH)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 1;H) = H"C
H"C + L(1  "C)  
H(1  "C)q0AH
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
=
HL

"2Cq
0
AL   (1  "C)2q0AH

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
 :
The former is always strictly positive. On the other hand, the sign of latter is not be
determined. It is strictly negative if and only if "2Cq
0
AL   (1   "C)2q0AH < 0. Hence, we
need to consider the condition for no-deviation for every case. If "2Cq
0
AL (1 "C)2q0AH > 0,
bA(0; 0)   bC(0; 1;H) > 0. So in this case, v values both beliefs with weight h. Thus the
condition is
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] + h
 
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 1;H)

> Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] + h
 
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 1;H)

() H(1  "C)(1  qA)qH + L"C(1  qA)qL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
+ h
H(1  "C)L"C(q0AL   q0AH)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

> H(1  "C)qA(1  qH) + L"CqA(1  qL)
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
+ h
HL

"2Cq
0
AL   (1  "C)2q0AH

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

()  > H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H(1  "C)q
0
AH + L"C q
0
AL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
 11 2"C
H"C+L(1 "C)  h
: (4.17)
In the opposite case in which "2Cq
0
AL (1 "C)2q0AH < 0, the weight of bA(0; 0) bC(0; 1;H)
51
is 1. Then the condition is
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] + h
 
bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 1;H)

> Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] + 
 
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 1;H)

() H(1  "C)(1  qA)qH + L"C(1  qA)qL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
+ h
H(1  "C)L"C(q0AL   q0AH)
H(1  "C) + L"C

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

> H(1  "C)qA(1  qH) + L"CqA(1  qL)
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
+ 
HL

"2Cq
0
AL   (1  "C)2q0AH

H"C + L(1  "C)

H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL

()  > H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H(1  "C)q
0
AH + L"C q
0
AL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
 1
1 2"C
H"C+L(1 "C)  
(1 h)(1 "C)"C(q0AL q0AH)
H(1 "C)q0AH+L"Cq0AL
: (4.18)
Actually, "2Cq
0
AL   (1   "C)2q0AH < 0, the condition for bA(0; 0)   bC(0; 1;H) < 0, is
equivalent to the condition that the third term of (4.18) is smaller than that of (4.17).
And you can see that the rst and second terms in them are the same. That is, the third
term of the condition that  has to satisfy is smaller one of the third terms of (4.17) and
(4.18). Therefore, they are summarized as
 >H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H(1  "C)q
0
AH + L"C q
0
AL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
min
8<: 11 2"C
H"C+L(1 "C)  h
;
1
1 2"C
H"C+L(1 "C)  
(1 h)(1 "C)"C(q0AL q0AH)
H(1 "C)q0AH+L"Cq0AL
9=; : (4.19)
At last, we calculate the condition to choose c = 0 for a = 0, sC = 0 and qCC . In this
case, the dierences of beliefs are
bA(0; 0)  bC(0; 0; L) = H"C
H"C + L(1  "C)  
H"CqAH
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
=
HL(1  "C)"C(qAL   qAH)
H"C + L(1  "C)

H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL

bA(0; 1)  bC(0; 0; L) = H(1  "C)
H(1  "C) + L"C  
H"CqAH
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
=
HL

(1  "C)2qAL   "2CqAH

H(1  "C) + L"C

H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
 :
Though the former is always strictly negative, the latter is undetermined. The con-
dition for this to be strictly negative is (1   "C)2qAL < "2CqAH . By similar way in the
previous case, we can state that the chooser does not deviate if
 6 H"C + L(1  "C)
HL
 H"C qAH + L(1  "C)qAL
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
max
8<: 1(1 2"C)h
H(1 "C)+L"C +
(1 h)"C(1 "C)(qAH qAL)
H"CqAH+L(1 "C)qAL
;
1
1 2"C
H(1 "C)+L"C
9=; : (4.20)
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Therefore, the pair of strategies is an equilibrium if (4.14), (4.15), (4.16), (4.19) and
(4.20) are satised. You can see that the conditions for the chooser's rebellious action,
(4.15) and (4.19), require that  is suciently large. This is intuitive since the source of
this kind of action is his self-condence and  represents the weight of it. On the other
hand, the conditions for the chooser's amenable action, (4.16) and (4.20), require that  is
suciently small. In this strategy the chooser chooses amenable action if he received the
signal saying his precision is low. If he behaves rebelliously in this situation, the outcome
tends to be wrong. When  is suciently small, the chooser follows the advice by the
adviser, who may have higher precision than him, in order to choose a right alternative
rather than arguing that his precision is high.
We can conrm that there are tuples of parameter for which the conditions hold. For
example, if h = 0:7, L = 0:75, "A = 0:01, "C = 0:01, qL = 0:51, qH = 0:9 and qA = 0:8,
the rst in (4.14) is 0:03 6 2:44 and the second is 0:003 6 0:41 for the adviser. The
chooser's condition is also satised if 2:89 6  6 3:35. Thus, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.2.1. There are tuples of parameters for which the pair of strategies is an
equilibrium.
Of course, this is not the unique parameters for which the conditions are satised. If
 6 3, for example, conditions hold for approximately 1 percent of parameters.
In fact, h < 1 is a necessary condition for the pair of strategies to be an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2.2. There is no tuple of parameters for which the pair of strategies being
an equilibrium if h = 1.
Proof. Suppose that h = 1. Then (4.20) is equivalent to
 6 H"C + L(1  "C)
HL
 H"C qAH + L(1  "C)qAL
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL 
1
1 2"C
H(1 "C)+L"C
:
It is necessary for the pair of strategies to be an equilibrium that there exists  that
satises at least this inequality and (4.15). To this, it must hold that
H(1  "C) + L"C
HL
 H(1  "C)qAH + L"C qAL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL 
H"C + L(1  "C)
1  2"C
6 H"C + L(1  "C)
HL
 H"C qAH + L(1  "C)qAL
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL 
1
1 2"C
H(1 "C)+L"C
() qAHqAL 6 qAH qAL:
By the denitions of qAH , qAL, qAH and qAL,
qAHqAL 6 qAH qAL
() qAqH   (1  qA)(1  qH)qAqL + (1  qA)(1  qL)
6

qAqH + (1  qA)(1  qH)

qAqL   (1  qA)(1  qL)

() qH(1  qL) 6 qL(1  qH) () qH 6 qL:
This contradicts the assumption that qH > qL.
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4.2.2 An alternative equilibrium
It is dicult to nd all equilibria since there probably be equilibria that players take
behavioral strategies that attain positive probability for several actions. In this section,
we investigate the following pair of strategies:
Adviser:(
a =  if qCA = qH
a = sA if qCA = qL
(4.21)
Chooser:(
c = sC if a =  or qCC = qH
c = a if a 6=  and qCC = qL:
(4.22)
The dierence between this strategy and that in the previous section is the action of the
chooser when a 6=  and qCC = qH . Though the apparent actions of these two strategies
may be identical, it is dierent that the chooser's emotions behind. When the chooser
follows (4.2), he wants to show that his precision is high rather than to choose right
alternative. On the other hand, when the chooser follows (4.22) cannot completely show
that his precision is high since the adviser cannot distinguish his precision if c = a. Thus
the chooser following (4.22) wants to balance choosing right alternative and showing his
precision.
The way to show that this pair of strategies is an equilibrium is approximately the same
as previous one. Especially, the prediction of right alternative and the self evaluations by
the chooser do not change because the strategy of the adviser does not change. The
predictions of right choice by the adviser are collected up in the appendix A.4.
The conditions for the adviser, who cares only the material outcome, to follow the
strategy (4.21) are summarized as follows:
L"A(L   qL) 6 H(1  "A)(H   (1  qH))
H(1  "A)(H   qH) 6 L"A(L   (1  qL))
L(1  "A)(L   (1  L)) > H"A(H   (1  H))
L(1  "A)(L   qL) > H"A(H   (1  qH));
where L  "C(1  qA)qL+(1  "C)qA and H  "C(1  qA)+ (1  "C)qAqH . Since L and
H do not have the property that is stated in lemma 4.2.1, these conditions do not imply
each other.
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Theconditionsforthechoosertofolow(4.22)are1
Pr[x=0|a=0,sC=0,qCC=qH]+βv(bA(0,0)−bC(0,0,H))
⩾Pr[x=1|a=0,sC=0,qCC=qH]+βv(bA(0,1)−bC(0,0,H))
Pr[x=0|a=0,sC=1,qCC=qL]+βv(bA(0,0)−bC(0,0,L))
⩾Pr[x=1|a=0,sC=1,qCC=qL]+βv(bA(0,1)−bC(0,0,L))
Pr[x=1|a=0,sC=1,qCC=qH]+βv(bA(0,1)−bC(0,1,H))
⩾Pr[x=0|a=0,sC=1,qCC=qH]+βv(bA(0,0)−bC(0,1,H))
Pr[x=0|a=0,sC=0,qCC=qL]+βv(bA(0,0)−bC(0,0,L))
⩾Pr[x=1|a=0,sC=0,qCC=qL]+βv(bA(0,1)−bC(0,0,L)).
Therearesometuplesofparametersforwhichalconditionsfortheadviserandthe
chooseraresatisﬁed,forexample,β=3,h=0.5,aL=0.5,eA=0.2,eC=0.2,qL=0.51,
qA=0.75,qH=0.85.Approximately2.6percentofparameterscansatisfytheconditions
whenβ⩽3.Therefore,wehavethefolowingproposition.
Proposition4.2.3.Therearesituationsinwhichthepairofstrategies(4.21)and(4.22)
isanequilibrium.
Itisworthtoseethatthispairofstrategiescanbeanequilibriumevenifh=1.For
example,whenβ=1.5,h=1,aL=0.5,eA =0.2,eC =0.2,qL=0.51,qA =0.75,
qH=0.85,conditionsaresatisﬁed.Thush<1isnotnecessaryconditionforthestrategy
beinganequilibrium,whichdiﬀersfromthepairofstrategy(4.1)and(4.2).
4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 IndependencefromSelf-Evaluation
Wehaveassumedthatthechooser’svaluationforreputationdependsonhisself-evaluation.
Concretely,wehavespecializedthevaluationfunctionas
v(bA,bC)=
{
h(bA−bC)ifbA⩾bC
bA−bC otherwise,
whereh∈(0,1).Youmaythinkthatthisspecializationistooatypical.Othersimpleand
typicalwaytomeasurethevalueofreputationistoletvbeaincreasingfunctionforbA,
whichdoesnotdependonchooser’sself-evaluation.Infact,however,thepairofstrategies
(4.1)and(4.2)isnotanequilibriumforthispreference.
Proposition4.3.1.Foranyincreasingfunctionv:[0,1]→R,whichdoesnotdependon
bC,thepairoffolowingstrategyisnotanequilibrium.
Adviser: {
a=ϕ ifqCA=qH
a=sA ifqCA=qL
1Thechooser’spredictionofhisreputationbytheadviserafterchoosingaalternativeisderivedas
bA(0,0)=bA(1,1)= σH[(1 εC)qAH+εC]σH[(1 εC)qAH+εC]+σL[εCqAL+(1 εC)]
bA(0,1)=bA(1,0)= σH(1 εC)q
′AH
σH(1 εC)q′AH+σLεCq′AL.
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Chooser: 8><>:
c = sC if a = 
c = a if a 6=  and qCC = qL
c 6= a if a 6=  and qCC = qH
Proof. At rst, we consider the case in which v is strictly increasing. The most part of this
model are identical to that in the previous section except that conditions for the chooser
not to deviate. Thus we show that he deviates for this valuation function. When a = 0,
sC = 0 and qCC = qH , choosing c = 1 is better for the chooser than c = 0. For this, the
following must hold
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] + v(bA(0; 1))
> Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] + v(bA(0; 0)) (4.23)
()  > 2Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]  1
v(bA(0; 1))  v(bA(0; 0)) :
When a = 0, sC = 0 and qCC = qL, the condition for the chooser to chooses c = 0 is
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL] + v(bA(0; 0))
> Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL] + v(bA(0; 1))
()  6 2Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL]  1
v(bA(0; 1))  v(bA(0; 0))
Note that bA(0; 1) > bA(0; 0) holds by lemma 4.2.4, so v(bA(0; 1)) > v(bA(0; 0)) since v is
strictly increasing. For the existence of  that satises these conditions, it must hold that
2Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]  1
v(bA(0; 1))  v(bA(0; 0)) 6
2Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL]  1
v(bA(0; 1))  v(bA(0; 0))
() Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] 6 Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL]:
Substituting each probability, we have
H(1  "C)qAqH + L"CqAqL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL 6
H"CqAqH + L(1  "C)qAqL
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
() 2H"C(1  "C)qAHqAqH + LH"2CqAHqAqL
+ HL(1  "C)2qALqAqH + 2L"C(1  "C)qALqAqL
6 2H"C(1  "C)qAHqAqH + LH(1  "C)2qAHqAqL
+ HL"
2
CqALqAqH + 
2
L"C(1  "C)qALqAqL
() f1  2"Cg qALqH 6 f1  2"Cg qAHqL
() fqAqL + (1  qA)(1  qL)g qH 6 fqAqH + (1  qA)(1  qH)g qL
() qH 6 qL:
However, this contradicts qH > qL.
Next we consider the case in which v is weakly increasing. What is important is v such
that v(bA(0; 1)) = v(bA(0; 0)). In this case, by (4.23),
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] > Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]
() Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] 6 1
2
() H(1  "C)qAqH + L"CqAqL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL 6
1
2
() H(1  "C)(qA + qH   1) + L"C(qA + qL   1) 6 0:
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This is a contradiction since qH > qA > qL > 1=2.
4.4 Conclusion
We have investigated psychological reactance from a view point of economics. Though
the reason of the phenomenon has been regarded as a restoration of threatened freedom
for a long time, we proposed other explanation for it. Our key assumption is that the
chooser cares his reputation by the adviser. Especially, what is important is the value of
reputation depends on his self-evaluation. Our contribution is the presentation of a formal
model that describes the psychological reactance as the equilibrium of a game. Though
there may be other equilibria and preferences that realize a reactive behavior, we think
that this nding is a big step.
There are still many problems remaining. The task that we want to deal with is the
extension of the precision space of the chooser, which have been assumed to be discrete.
If the precision is extended to continuous one as Levy (2004) does, we will be able to
get a better sense of relation between psychological reactance and the eect of reputation
concern.
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Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 3
A.1 The probability of right choice for strategy (4.2)
In this appendix, we describe the adviser's subjective probability with which the chooser
chooses a right alternative, which is discussed in section 4.2.1. These probabilities have
some kind of symmetric property. For example, the probability under (qCA; sA; a) =
(qH ; 0; 1) is the same as that under (qCA; sA; a) = (qH ; 1; 0).
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 0] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 1]
=
L"A + H(1  "A)(1  )
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 1] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 0]
=
L"A(1  ) + H(1  "A)
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = ]
=
L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 1]
=
L(1  "A) + H"A(1  )
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 1] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 0]
=
L(1  "A)(1  ) + H"A
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = ] = Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = ]
=
L(1  "A)qL + H"AqH
L(1  "A) + H"A
A.2 The chooser's predictions of right alternative for strat-
egy (4.1)
In this appendix, we present the chooser's predictions of right alternative after observing a,
sC and qCC . Again, the symmetric property in the previous appendix holds. For example,
if qCC = qH , the probability of x = 0 when (a; sC) = (1; 0) is the same as that of x = 1
when (a; sC) = (0; 1).
59
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 1 j a = 1; sC = 1; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "C)qAqH + L"CqAqL
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 0 j a = 1; sC = 1; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "C)(1  qA)(1  qH) + L"C(1  qA)(1  qL)
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 1 j a = 1; sC = 1; qCC = qL]
=
H"CqAqH + L(1  "C)qAqL
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 0; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 0 j a = 1; sC = 1; qCC = qL]
=
H"C(1  qA)(1  qH) + L(1  "C)(1  qA)(1  qL)
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 1 j a = 1; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "C)qA(1  qH) + L"CqA(1  qL)
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 0 j a = 1; sC = 0; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "C)(1  qA)qH + L"C(1  qA)qL
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
Pr[x = 0 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 1 j a = 1; sC = 0; qCC = qL]
=
H"CqA(1  qH) + L(1  "C)qA(1  qL)
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
Pr[x = 1 j a = 0; sC = 1; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 0 j a = 1; sC = 0; qCC = qL]
=
H"C(1  qA)qH + L(1  "C)(1  qA)qL
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
Pr[x = 0 j a = ; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 1 j a = ; sC = 1; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "A)(1  "C)qH + L"A"CqL
H(1  "A)(1  "C) + L"A"C
Pr[x = 1 j a = ; sC = 0; qCC = qH ] = Pr[x = 0 j a = ; sC = 1; qCC = qH ]
=
H(1  "A)(1  "C)(1  qH) + L"A"C(1  qL)
H(1  "A)(1  "C) + L"A"C
Pr[x = 0 j a = ; sC = 0; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 1 j a = ; sC = 1; qCC = qL]
=
H(1  "A)"CqH + L"A(1  "C)qL
H(1  "A)"C + L"A(1  "C)
Pr[x = 1 j a = ; sC = 0; qCC = qL] = Pr[x = 0 j a = ; sC = 1; qCC = qL]
=
H(1  "A)"C(1  qH) + L"A(1  "C)(1  qL)
H(1  "A)"C + L"A(1  "C)
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A.3 The posterior of qC by the chooser for strategy (4.1)
We collect up the posterior of qC by the chooser. These are the probabilities of qC = qH
with observation (a; sC ; qCC).
bC(0; 0;H) = bC(1; 1;H) =
H(1  "C)qAH
H(1  "C)qAH + L"CqAL
bC(0; 0; L) = bC(1; 1; L) =
H"CqAH
H"CqAH + L(1  "C)qAL
bC(0; 1;H) = bC(1; 0;H) =
H(1  "C)q0AH
H(1  "C)q0AH + L"Cq0AL
bC(0; 1; L) = bC(1; 0; L) =
H"Cq
0
AH
H"Cq0AH + L(1  "C)q0AL
bC(; 0;H) = bC(; 1;H) =
H(1  "A)(1  "C)
H(1  "A)(1  "C) + L"A"C
bC(; 0; L) = bC(; 1; L) =
H(1  "A)"C
H(1  "A)"C + L"A(1  "C)
A.4 The probability of right choice for strategy (4.22)
In this appendix, we describe the adviser's subjective probability with which the chooser
chooses a right alternative when he follows 4.22, which is discussed in section 4.2.2, where
L  "C(1  qA)qL + (1  "C)qA and H  "C(1  qA) + (1  "C)qAqH .
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 0] = L"AL + H(1  "A)(1  H)
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = 1] = L"A(1  L) + H(1  "A)H
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 0; a = ] = L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 0] = L"A(1  L) + H(1  "A)H
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = 1] = L"AL + H(1  "A)(1  H)
L"A + H(1  "A)
Pr[c = x j qCA = qH ; sA = 1; a = ] = L"AqL + H(1  "A)qH
L"A + H(1  "A)
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Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 0] = L(1  "A)L + H"A(1  H)
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = 1] = L(1  "A)(1  L) + H"AH
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 0; a = ] = L(1  "A)qL + H"AqH
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 0] = L(1  "A)(1  L) + H"AH
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = 1] = L(1  "A)L + H"A(1  H)
L(1  "A) + H"A
Pr[c = x j qCA = qL; sA = 1; a = ] = L(1  "A)qL + H"AqH
L(1  "A) + H"A :
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